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JURISDICTION
The Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3102(3)0).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
ISSUE 1:

Did the trial court err in ruling that certain accident history evidence

was inadmissible under 23 U.S.C. § 409, even if the data was made public, was in the
possession of the University of Utah and/or used for reasons unrelated to federal funding?
Standard of Review: Interpretation of a statute is a question of law
reviewed for correctness. Reese v. Tingey Construction, 2008 UT 7, § 6, 177 P.3d 605.
Preservation: This issue was raised below in the Millers' briefing (R. 638656, 723-729), and in the Order on Plaintiffs5 Motion to Compel (R. 911-913).
ISSUE 2:

Did the trial court err in allowing defendant UDOT to use the

evidentiary privilege under 23 U.S.C. § 409 as both a shield (preventing plaintiff from
discovering or eliciting evidence regarding accident history) and a sword (using the
absence of evidence to create an inference that there was no accident history)? Included
within this issue is whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that no
adverse inference should be drawn from the absence of the excluded evidence.
Standard of Review:

Generally, a trial court's decision to admit or

exclude specific evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Cruz-Meza, 2003
UT 32, \ 8, 76 P.3d 1165. However, a party against whom an adverse inference might be
drawn from the invocation of a privilege is entitled as a matter of right to an instruction
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precluding the drawing of any such inference. Utah Rule of Evidence 507(c)(3) and
Advisory Committee Note Subparagraph (c). A trial court's refusal to give a proposed
jury instruction is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Brewer v. Denver & Rio
Grande Western Railroad, 2001 UT 77,1 38, 31 P3d 557.
Preservation: This issue was raised both before and at trial in the Millers'
briefing (R. 1156-1157); the Order Regarding Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel (R. 1410);
Plaintiffs' Trial Memorandum Re: Prohibiting Disclosure and Use of Accident Data
Pursuant to 23 U.S.C. § 409 (R. 2196-2200); Plaintiffs' Proposed Jury Instruction No. 51
(R. 2156); Pre-trial Hearing of May 10, 2010, pp. 21-24, 27-30 (Addendum 2); and at
trial (R. 2708, p. 6, 8-18; R. 2712, pp. 67-68, 160).
ISSUE 3:

In a situation in which every potential juror faced an inherent

conflict of interest by reason of being a taxpayer and consumer of the road system
managed exclusively by the defendant (UDOT), did the trial court err by allowing only
limited court voir dire and denying the Millers' request for a written jury questionnaire?
Standard of Review: A trial court's management of jury voir dire is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Alcazar v. University of Utah Hospitals, et ai9 2008
UT App 222 K 9, 188 P.3d 490, 493. Parties are entitled to seek sufficient information in
voir dire to intelligently use peremptory challenges. Id., ^ 10.
Preservation: This issue was raised below in the Millers' briefing (R.
1428-1449, 1871-1875); and during pre-trial hearings March 29, 2010, pp. 10-11
(Addendum 4), and May 10, 2010, pp. 8-12, 32-34 (Addendum 2).
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ISSUE 4:

Under the circumstances of this case, did the trial court err in

refusing to give plaintiffs' proposed jury instruction that there is a statutory cap on
damages and that the money would be paid from a risk management pool rather than
directly by taxes or a decrease in roadway services?
Standard of Review: The trial court's refusal to give a jury instruction is a
question of law reviewed for correctness. Brewer, supra.
Preservation: This issue was raised below in plaintiffs' proposed jury
instructions nos. 49 and 55 (R. 2153 and 2537); in plaintiffs' briefing (R. 2535-2538);
and during trial with exceptions (R. 2712, pp. 66-69).
ISSUE 5:

Did the trial court err in denying plaintiffs' request to invoke the

witness exclusionary rule as contained in Rule 615, Utah Rules of Evidence?
Standard of Review:

The trial court's refusal to apply the witness

exclusionary rule is reviewed for correctness. Ostler v. Buhler, 1999 UT 99, \ 5, 989
P.2d 1073.
Preservation:

This issue was raised below at trial. (R. 2709, pp. 5-

7.)
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
23U.S.C. §409(pre-1995):
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, reports, surveys, schedules,
lists, or data compiled for the purpose of identifying, evaluating, or
planning the safety enhancement of potential accident sites, hazardous
roadway conditions, or railway-highway crossings, pursuant to sections
130, 144, and 152 of this title or for the purpose of developing any highway
safety construction improvement project which may be implemented
3

utilizing Federal-aid highway funds shall not be admitted into evidence in
Federal or State court or considered for other purposes in any action for
damages arising from any occurrence at a location mentioned or addressed
in such reports, surveys, schedules, lists, or data.
23 U.S.C. § 409 (as amended, 1995):
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, reports, surveys, schedules,
lists, or data compiled or collected for the purpose of identifying,
evaluating, or planning the safety enhancement of potential accident sites,
hazardous roadway conditions, or railway-highway crossings, pursuant to
sections 130, 144, and 152 of this title or for the purpose of developing any
highway safety construction improvement project which may be
implemented utilizing Federal-aid highway funds shall not be subject to
discovery or admitted into evidence in Federal or State court or considered
for other purposes in any action for damages arising from any occurrence at
a location mentioned or addressed in such reports, surveys, schedules, lists,
or data.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the case, course of proceedings, and disposition below
This case arises out of an accident that occurred on June 26, 2004, on Interstate 15
north of the Kaysville exit in Davis County, Utah. Jackilyn Neal, a 57-year-old diabetic,
lost consciousness and crossed the open median at approximately 70 mph, colliding head
on with the Millers' vehicle.
The Millers filed suit against the Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT")
on September 7, 2005, alleging that UDOT was liable for failing to install median
barriers in a 1,735 foot length of roadway in which the accident took place ("the gap").
(R. 1-4.) (Median barriers had been erected to the north and south of the gap. (PL Exh.
9).) It is undisputed that a median barrier would have prevented the accident.
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During discovery, the trial court granted UDOT's motion to exclude any data or
information used or compiled by UDOT regarding prior accident history in the vicinity of
the accident. (R. 400-402.) The court also excluded the same accident data that was
available to the public and that UDOT had provide d to the University of Utah for
unrelated medical research. (R. 913.)
The case was tried to a jury from May 24 to June 2, 2010. On the second day of
deliberations, the jury (in a six to two vote) answered only one question on the three page
special verdict form finding that UDOT was not at fault. (R. 2713, pp. 4-6.) Judgment
against the Millers was entered on June 18, 2010 (Addendum 1). (R. 2649-2650.)
Millers timely appealed (R. 2683), and UDOT cross appealed (R. 2685).
Statement of Facts
On June 26, 2004, Jackilyn Neal, a 57-year-old diabetic, was traveling northbound
on 1-15 in Davis County. Just north of the Kaysville exit, Ms. Neal lost consciousness,
crossed the open median at approximately 70 mph, and collided head on with the vehicle
in which Jason, his wife (Melissa) and their young daughter (Megan) were riding. (R.
2708, pp. 156, 160-161; 2710, pp. 233-236.) The Millers were severely injured, with
collective past and future medical expenses exceeding $1,000,000.00.

(PL Exh. 33.)

Ms. Neal was killed.
In 1995 and 1999, UDOT had two major construction projects in the area of the
accident in which median barriers had been installed to the north and south of a 1,735foot long stretch of roadway (ccthe gap"). (Def. Exhs. 4, 5.) Ms. NeaPs vehicle crossed
the median in the gap. (PL Exh. 9.)
5

UDOT witnesses testified at trial that UDOT had not performed any study or
analysis regarding the need of a median barrier in the gap. (R. 2709, pp. 187-188.) Darin
Fred Duersch, a Rule 30(b)(6) witness designated by UDOT on this issue, testified that
UDOT could not explain why the gap did not have median barriers:
Q.

And as part of your investigation as a 30 (b)(6) witness, you didn't find out
why?

A.

I was unable to find out why.

(R. 2709, pp. 67-68.)
Based on the 1995 plans and specification prepared by UDOT (which included the
gap within the project (R. 2709, p. 187)), the cost of installing median barriers was
approximately $35 per foot, which means it would have cost $60,000 to have filled in the
gap. (R. 2710, pp. 26-27; PL Exh. 40, p. 2.) The total cost of the project was $5.5
million. (Pl.Exh. 40, p. 3; R. 2709, pp. 185-186.)
Instead of installing barriers in the gap in 1995, UDOT installed attenuators at the
end of the barriers immediately to the north and south, at the cost of $24,000 each.1 In
the 1999 project, UDOT replaced these two attenuators at approximately the same cost.
Between the two projects, UDOT paid approximately $30,000 more for the attenuators
than it would have cost to place a barrier in the gap, which if installed, would have
eliminated the need for the attenuators. (R. 2710, pp. 29-30, 34.)

An attenuator is a collapsible metal system installed at the end of a median barrier to
mitigate the severity of an impact when a vehicle hits the end of the barrier. (R. 2710, p.
28.)
6

David Lee Kennison, UDOTs twenty-five year Regional One (northern Utah)
Traffic Engineer whose responsibilities included determining the need for median
barriers on 1-15, did not explain the absence of the barrier in the gap. He also served on
UDOTs hazard elimination project committee, the purpose of which was to identify
safety concerns on the roadway system. Mr. Kennison testified that the committee had
not met for several years before his retirement in 2002. (R. 2709, pp. 248,255-256,259.)
In 2003, Darin Fred Duersch replaced Mr. Kennison and, shortly thereafter,
recognized a need to have median barriers installed in certain open areas on 1-15 in Davis
and Weber Counties, including the gap. Due to the natural delays in planning and
funding, this project did not start until 2005. (R. 2709, pp. 45, 59-60, 62.)
UDOT stated at trial that when addressing a need for median barriers, it followed
the guidelines of the American Association of State Highway and Transportation
Officials ("AASHTO"). (R. 2709, p. 251.) AASHTO identifies the following factors to
be considered by traffic engineers when deciding to install median barriers: (1) the width
of the median, (2) average traffic volume, (3) accident history, and (4) average traffic
speed. Other factors included a cost/benefit analysis, the presence of on or off ramps, and
geometry of the roadway (curves, slopes and grades). (R. 2709, pp. 251-253; R. 2710,
pp. 38-51; R. 2711, pp. 236-237.)
•

Width of Median: The median at the accident site was 40 feet wide.

(PL Exh. 9.) Under the AASHTO guidelines, a median barrier was required on a freeway
if the median was less than 30 feet. Between 30 and 50 feet, it was optional, subject to
sound engineering judgment. (R. 2709, pp. 73-74; R. 2710, p. 45.) Beyond 50 feet, a
7

median barrier was not required. (R. 2710, p. 52.) UDOT's fault, therefore, turned on
the remaining factors.
•

Average traffic volume: UDOT's Regional One Traffic Engineer

agreed that the greater the volume of traffic, the greater the need for a median barrier. (R.
2709, p. 251.) In 1995, the average traffic volume was increasing yearly and was
projected by UDOT to hit AASHTO's maximum volume (80,000 vehicles per day)
within a few years. The volume of large truck traffic was also unusually high at 15
percent. This factor therefore supported the placement of median barriers. (R. 2710,, pp.
38-39,45-50; PL Exh. 38, 39.)
•

Accident history: UDOT successfully resisted the Millers' efforts to

discover or introduce evidence of the accident history in the area of the accident,
claiming a federal exclusionary rule under 23 U.S.C. § 409. The jury therefore had no
information about this factor, other than an inference from the absence of such evidence
that there was no prior accident history. (See infra.)
•

Average speed:

Because the accident occurred on 1-15, it was

undisputed that the average speed was at the maximum level under AASHTO's
guidelines. Mr. Kennison conceded that the higher the speed, the greater the need for a
barrier. (R. 2709, p. 252.) This factor therefore weighed in favor of a median barrier.
(R. 2710, pp. 41, 47-48.)

2

Large trucks usually go slower and result in cars maneuvering around them. This
creates a higher risk for vehicular interference and crossover accidents. (R. 2710, pp. 3940.)
8

Other factors:

The cost/benefit analysis to be performed related to

the cost to society from preventable injury and death in comparison to the reasonable
ability of UDOT to prevent it. (R. 2709, pp. 202-203; R. 2711, pp. 236-237.) Obviously,
this analysis was hindered without the accident history. The jury therefore only heard the
dollar cost of installing the barriers compared with the cost of the attenuators, which
weighed in favor of having barriers.
On- and off-ramps were also present in the area on both sides of the highway.
These ramps, particularly the on-ramp, affected the flow of traffic as cars maneuvered to
let slower traffic onto the freeway, thus increasing the risk of vehicular interference and
cross-over accidents. (R. 2710, pp. 48-49.) This factor thus militated in favor of the
installation of barriers. Geometry of the roadway was essentially a non-factor, as the
road and median where the accident occurred was relatively flat and straight. This factor
would weigh in favor of not installing barriers. (Id, pp. 74-75.)
Exclusion of accident history evidence
During discovery, the Millers requested documents relating to the analysis and
evaluation of barriers in the area of the accident. As part of the production, UDOT
produced an internal memorandum dated April 12, 1994, which analyzed the number of
accidents, accident rate, severity and other related information in the relevant area and
concluded that, "Accident data indicates that both the accident rate and severity of this
section are higher than the expected." (R. 235-236.)
When the Millers used the memorandum during UDOT depositions, UDOT
instructed the witnesses not to answer and asserted an evidentiary privilege under 23
9

U.S.C. §409, a provision that protects accident data compiled (or, after 1995, "compiled
or collected") by a department of transportation as part of a federally-funded road project.
UDOT moved for a protective order excluding the "inadvertently produced"
memorandum and all other accident-related data (some of which the Millers obtained
through a GRAMA request). (R. 176-236.) The trial court granted UDOT's motion. (R.
400-402.)
Millers then subpoenaed the University of Utah, Intermountain Injury Control
Research Center, "Crash Outcome Data Evaluation System" (hereafter "CODES"), and
also subpoenaed the Utah Department of Public Safety3 to obtain crash data. Both of
these entities, together with UDOT, objected to the subpoenas. (R. 377, 383, 432.)
CODES had obtained from UDOT crash data and historical accident information
from 1992 through 2004. (R. 641; 675.) According to the CODES web site,
When first funded in 1992, the Utah CODES project used four 1991 populationbased data bases: motor vehicle crash records, completed by police officers at the
scene, collected by the Utah Department of Transportation UDOT); emergency
medical services runs collected by the Department of Health, Bureau of
Emergency Medical Services; emergency department and hospital discharge
records....
(R. 721.) The use of this information had nothing to do with 23 U.S.C. § 152 roadway
funding and the corresponding § 409 Exclusionary Rule. CODES used the data to
conduct public health activities and research. (R. 417.)

CODES publically published

extensive reports regarding crash data for cities, counties and other categories, including

3

The Utah Department of Public Safety stored the actual accident reports which the
investigating officer completed after each accident.
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the actual crash rates for all of the roads in Utah. (R. 454-594; 729-748; specifically, R.
744.745 crash data and rates from 1971 - 2001.)
After months of trying to resolve the disputed issues, the parties agreed to have the
court resolve the matter. (R. 786.) The trial court ruled that all of the crash data held by
CODES was protected under § 409, because the primary purpose of generation of the
information was for § 152 roadway funding.

However, the court ordered that the

Department of Public Safety produce the investigating officers' reports. (R. 911-913.)
That proved futile as the 22 boxes of reports only went back to 1998, which would have
been inapplicable for the 1995 and 1999 projects.4 (R. 1347.) All prior reports had been
destroyed. (Addendum 25, p. 29.)
Millers filed another motion for an in camera review, to challenge the additional
documents which UDOT claimed were privileged. (R. 1139-1140; 1143-1302.) As part
of this motion, Millers also asked the court to restrict UDOT from trying to take
advantage of the § 409 Exclusionary Rule by using the absence of accident history as
both a shield and sword against the Millers. (R. 1156-1157.)
The trial court agreed with UDOT that all of the documents were excluded
pursuant to § 409; however, the court expressed concern that § 409 created the potential
for prejudice and stated:
1995 and 1999 are the dates in which the projects were under construction. Planning,
designing and funding of the projects would have occurred a few years before.
5

The official transcript of the May 10, 2010 pre-trial conference does not appear to have
been included within the record on appeal, though it is filed with the court below. It is
anticipated that the transcript will be added to the record by motion, and is attached
hereto within the Addendum.
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I don't think that at trial you [UDOT] can suggest that this road is safe based upon
accident history that they [plaintiffs] don't have access to.
* * *

I don't think that you [UDOT] can rely on this data that you've determined to be
privileged in concluding that this stretch of highway was not dangerous....
* * *

You [UDOT] can't suggest there's no accident history.
* * *

Let's just limit it to say you cannot make any argument at the time of trial based
upon accident history that hasn't been provided to them [plaintiffs]. Let's just
leave it at that for now.
(R. 1403, 2197.) The court then issued the following order, "[N]either party should
attempt to take advantage of the fact that the evidence was excluded and unavailable to
plaintiffs". (R. 1410.)
Because UDOT continued to advance its defense that without an accident history,
there would be no requirement to have a barrier, Millers addressed the issue again with
the trial court in a pre-trial hearing shortly before trial. Millers explained that the experts
and UDOT witnesses would be referring to AASHTO, which states that the accident
history is a primary factor. As a solution, Millers proposed that the jury be told that there
was a data base that may or may not contain accident histories, but that because of federal
law it could not be used, and the jury should not draw any inference for or against either
party. Without such an explanation, Millers argued, the jury would be left to speculate
about the absence of a primary factor. The court proposed that Millers prepare a jury
instruction to address this, which Millers did and gave to the court at a second pre-trial
conference. (Addendum 2, pp. 21-24; R. 2707, p. 5.)
12

Millers filed a trial memorandum outlining the prejudice to them and the ways that
UDOT could take unfair advantage. (R. 2196-2200.) On the morning of trial, Millers
raised the issue again. The trial court expressed concern about the prejudice to Millers if
UDOT suggested or implied that the lack of evidence meant that there was no accident
history or that "the absence of accidents gives a reasonable inference of safety." (R.
2708, pp. 6, 10-12.)
UDOT argued that the standards required an analysis of the accident history and
said that it intended to cross-examine Millers' expert about the absence of prior accidents.
(Id, pp. 12-13.) The trial court allowed UDOT to ask if the expert was aware of any
accident history but would not allow further inquiry. Id. The court was disinclined to
give Millers' proposed instruction regarding § 409, but cautioned that if UDOT asked
about accident history, it might give the instruction, "because we can't leave the
inference out there that the accident history has been available to both sides and there was
no accident history." If UDOT opened the door, the court would give Millers' proposed
instruction. (Id, pp. 16-18.)
During trial, Millers steered clear of the accident history issue, presenting expert
about the other factors that would call for barriers. UDOT, however, did not. With the
first UDOT witness, Darin Duersch, UDOT elicited testimony that when considering
whether to install median barriers, traffic engineers have to look at crash history:
[I]t's hard to know whether or not [the absence of a median barrier is] a problem
or not until we evaluate it and take a look at the crashes, the frequency...[UDOT
staff] do an analysis that includes, ...geometries, alignment, traffic volumes,
median widths, crash history, all of those things. And then we determine if there
is potential for a project here.
13

(R. 2709, pp. 117-118) (emphasis added.)
On cross-examination of Millers' expert, UDOT went straight to the AASHTO
guidelines and asked about his prior testimony that traffic engineers are to analyze the
accident history to determine why prior accidents occurred and whether a barrier should
be installed. (R. 2710, pp. 68-69.) Referring to and quoting from AASHTO, UDOT
asked the expert to agree that for a median width between 30 and 50 feet, "a barrier may
not be warranted, again, depending on the cross-median accident history," which the
witness agreed was part of AASHTO. (Id., p. 64.)
When addressing jury instructions, Millers again argued the need of their proposed
Instruction 51, which explained (a) why there was no evidence of accident history, (b) the
application of § 409, and (c) that there should be no inference for or against either party
because the lack of said evidence. (See Instruction No. 51, Addendum 3.) The absence
of accident history was the "elephant in the courtroom." UDOT had elicited testimony
and referred to authoritative sources about it, while the Millers were precluded from
explaining the real circumstances. (R. 2712, pp. 67-68.) The trial court refused to give
the instruction.
Finally, in closing argument, UDOT held up the AASHTO book and read directly
from it as follows:
Likewise, for relatively wide medians, the probability of a vehicle crossing the
median is also low...thus, for median widths greater than 30 feet and within the
optional area of the figure, a barrier may or may not be warranted, again,
depending on the cross-median accident history.
(R. 2712, p. 148) (emphasis added).)
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Millers requested a side bar and again pointed out that UDOT had opened the
door.

Because of the court's exclusion of accident data and UDOT's continued

arguments referencing the lack of accident history, Millers argued that an unfair inference
had been created that there was no such history, the inaccuracy of which the Millers were
prevented from explaining. To mitigate the prejudice, Millers renewed their request for
the jury instruction (with a small modification), which the trial court denied. (Id., pp.
152,160.)
After deliberating Friday, the jury recessed for the weekend and continued its
deliberations most of the following morning. In a 6 to 2 vote, the jury answered only the
first question in the special verdict, finding that UDOT was not negligent. (R. 2713, pp.
4-6.)6
Voir Dire
Before trial, Millers raised with the trial court on several occasions the difficult
situation that this case presented in that all of the jurors had an inherent conflict of
interest, being taxpayers and consumers of UDOT's road system. The spring of 2010
saw extensive media coverage of budgetary shortfalls in the range of hundreds of
millions of dollars, stating that all government agencies would be cutting back. (See

Appellants were unable to find in the record the Special Verdict signed by the jury
foreman; however, the jury's finding is undisputed and is reflected in the transcript of the
trial court reading the question and answer from the verdict and polling the jury. Id.
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Addendum 4, p. 107; Addendum 2 pp. 9-12, 32-34; R. 1871-1875.) For example, Millers
presented a recent news article about UDOT "axing" eleven projects due to budget woes.
(R. 1874 ) Millers also addressed the potential bias from media coverage regarding tort
reform and presented a recent news article about that. (R. 1872 and duplicate 1872.)
To address these concerns, Millers requested that the trial court allow a relatively
short, written questionnaire to be filled out by the jury panel before selection began, or in
the alternative, to allow attorney voir dire. Millers argued that the task of discovering
subtle bias and prejudice for peremptory challenges was even more important when a
jury had an inherent conflict of interest. (R. 1428-1449.)
Millers presented authoritative articles confirming that prospective jurors are
typically hesitant to admit in open court in front of the judge, attorneys and their fellow
potential jurors, that they have concerns, feelings and biases that might influence their
ability to be fair. These authorities provided research demonstrating that jurors are less
candid in answering general questions which are addressed to the panel as a whole, than
when answering written questions in less intimidating situations. (R. 1442-1449.)
The trial judge acknowledged the potential for bias, the concern relating to dire
economic times, and the concern that taxes would increase or that road services would
diminish; but he expressed that his voir dire was not "perfunctory." He would thoroughly
explore all of these issues with the jury panel. Accordingly, he refused to allow attorney
7

The transcript of the March 29, 2010 pre-trial conference does not appear to be part of
the record on appeal, though it is filed with the court below. It is anticipated that the
transcript will be added to the record by motion.
8

There is a duplication of the following page numbers in the record: 1872-1875.
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voir dire or a jury questionnaire, expressing in part concern about the court's own limited
budget and concern about timely completing the trial.9

(Addendum 4, pp. 10-11;

Addendum 2, pp. 9-12.)
The trial court only asked two questions to the jury panel about UDOT as a
defendant:
Obviously, the State of Utah is the defendant in this case. Is there any of you
who would have any concern at all that your consideration of this case would
be affected by the fact that the State of Utah is a defendant? If you have any
concern about that please raise your hand."
Four people raised their hand. The court called each of the four to a side bar where an
unrecorded discussion was held. (R. 2708, pp. 57-58.)
Have any of you had any negative experience or have negative feelings about
UDOT, the Utah Department of Transportation? If you have, please raise your hand.
No one raised a hand. (Id., p. 85.).
Regarding tort reform bias, the court inquired as follows:
Is there any of you who have any view about awarding pain and suffering in
personal injury cases? You know when people are injured, we're not able to
wind back the clock and make everything the way it was before. And one of
the elements that we look at is how much pain and suffering have they
experienced and are likely to experience in the future. And we award
damages for that as part of your legal system.
Is there any of you that have any concerns about whether it's appropriate to
award pain and suffering, assuming that the evidence supports it, in a personal
injury case? If you have any concerns about that, please raise your hand.
No one raised a hand. (Id., p. 82)

9

The trial was scheduled for May 24 through June 2, 2010. (R. 1422-1423.) The actual
trial, including deliberations, was fully concluded June 1. (R. 2713.)
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Is there any of you that have any concerns about whether a lawsuit is a proper
way to resolve a dispute?
Some people are just, you know, under the view that for whatever reason they
think it's not morally appropriate to seek compensation or file a lawsuit for
damages. Do any of you have any concerns in that regard? If you do, please
raise your hand.
One person raised her hand, whereupon the court had a sidebar discussion that was
unrecorded. (Id., pp. 82-83.)
There's been an issue that's gotten a lot of publicity in the last few years, and
that is the whole issue of whether or not there is a lawsuit crisis, whether
there's a need for tort reform. Those are words that you may have used.
How many of you have been exposed to any kind of information with respect
to that issue? If you would raise your hand high.
Okay. Okay. Everybody-let's get all the hands.
Of those of you who have responded yes to that, which of you believe that
you would be influenced in any way in your deliberations by something that
you've been exposed to in that regard?
Out of the many who raised their hands to the first question, only one raised his hand
to the follow up question, Andrew Barrett, who was later struck for cause. (Id., p. 84.)
Requested Jury Instruction Regarding UDOT
To mitigate potential bias regarding increased taxation or diminished road services,
Millers proposed the following jury instructions, which the court denied:
As of the date of this accident, injury claims against a governmental agency such as
UDOT is limited and capped at the amount of $532,500 for one individual and
$1,065,000 for all claims arising out of one accident. In other words, any one of the
Millers injury claims is limited to an amount no higher than $532,500, but their total
injury claims together cannot exceed $1,065,000.
This "cap" applies only to injury damages, not to personal property damage.
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If you find that UDOT was at fault to any degree, you must still determine the
amount of total damages that each of the Millers have suffered. I will make any
reductions or adjustments later.
Plaintiffs' Proposed Instruction no. 49. (R. 2153. See Addendum 5.)
If you make an award of damages against UDOT, you should not concern yourself
with how the payment will be made. A payment of an award will not affect roadway
services or maintenance. The source of any money that will be used to pay an award
must not influence you to award more or less in damages. The award of damages
must be based only on the evidence you have heard during the trial. You must not
speculate on anything else.
Plaintiffs' Proposed Instruction No. 55. (R. 2535-2537. See Addendum 6.)
Exclusionary rule
At the beginning of the second trial day, Millers invoked the exclusionary rule
when two of UDOT's witnesses sat down in the courtroom. The court denied the request,
ruling that Millers were required to have invoked the rule at the beginning of trial before
opening statements. (R. 2709, pp. 5-7 ("I'm going to rule that you are too late in
invoking it....So it will be perfectly appropriate for witnesses to be in the courtroom
during the course of the trial from this point forward.").)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs in this matter have been unable to fairly present their case to the jury,
and were thereby denied due process.

Faced with a restrictive federally mandated

evidentiary privilege tied to the acquisition of federal funds which prevents the
introduction of relevant probative evidence of accident history held by Defendant UDOT,
Plaintiffs sought and found other sources for the accident history evidence necessary to
their case. Those sources include a database created and held by the University of Utah's
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School of Medicine, and data created and held by the Department of Public Safety and
the Utah Highway Patrol, all of which contained relevant probative evidence of the
essential accident history. However, Plaintiffs were prevented from developing that
evidence or from submitting that evidence to the jury by the trial court's erroneous
rulings which broadened the effects of the federal privilege, applying it to data not held
by UDOT and not created for purposes covered by the federal law.
In addition, after preventing plaintiffs from acquiring and submitting relevant
probative evidence from non-privileged sources, the trial court refused to give a jury
instruction requested by Plaintiffs. The instruction would have guided the jury about the
effects of the federal privilege and would have mitigated the unfair damage done by
UDOT's trial strategy of focusing the jury on the seeming lack of accident history
evidence.
Additionally, the trial court erred in refusing to allow a jury questionnaire or to
engage in voir dire as needed to assess jurors' biases and exercise peremptory challenges,
particularly when each juror had an inherent conflict of interest as a taxpayer and
consumer of UDOT5 s road system.
The trial court further erred in refusing to exclude UDOT's witnesses from the
courtroom on the grounds that U.R.E. 615's exclusionary rule must be invoked before
opening statement or else it is waived.

Neither the rule nor case law from other

jurisdictions construing a similar rule specify a time period in which exclusion must be
invoked.
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Finally, the cumulative effect of the trial court's errors sufficiently undermines
confidence in the fairness of the trial that a new trial is warranted.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT CERTAIN
ACCIDENT HISTORY EVIDENCE WAS INADMISSIBLE UNDER
23 U.S.C. § 409, EVEN THOUGH THE DATA WAS MADE PUBLIC,
WAS IN THE POSSESSION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH,
AND/OR WAS USED FOR REASONS UNRELATED TO FEDERAL
FUNDING.

23 U.S.C. § 409 provides that reports, surveys, schedules, lists, or data compiled
(or, after 1995, collected) for the purpose of identifying, evaluating, or planning the
safety improvements of potential accident sites and hazardous roadway conditions, for
the purpose of developing any highway safety or construction improvement project
which may be implemented with Federal-aid highway funds, shall not be subject to
discovery or admitted into evidence in Federal or State court proceedings.
Needing to avoid the limitations presented by the UDOT § 409 data, and knowing
that the industry standards pertaining to when a median barrier should be installed
embraces a number of factors including the historical accident rate or crash rate, Plaintiffs
also subpoenaed information and data held by the University of Utah's Intermountain
Injury Control Research Center in its Crash Outcome Data Evaluation System (CODES)
(R. 432), from the Department of Public Safety (DPS) (R. 377-382 and 383-388), and
from the Department of Health (DOH) (R. 389-394). Although the parties negotiated at
length, they were unable to resolve their disputes regarding the discovery and
admissibility of the data sought by Plaintiffs. The University of Utah moved to quash the
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subpoena (R. 412-413), and Plaintiffs moved to compel production of the data from the
University, and DPS. (R. 635-636.)
The University stated that the data in its CODES database came from UDOT, DPS
and DOH pursuant to agreements of confidentiality, security, limited use and disclosure.
In part, the University argued that the data was protected by 23 U.S.C. § 409 (R. 423),
arguing that § 409 protects the data wherever it is held, regardless of the agency holding
it and irrespective of the reason for that agency to have the data. (R. 722G-722H.)
The trial court denied the motion to compel and ruled that "to the extent that the
underlying data provided to CODES by UDOT contains privileged information pursuant
to § 409 the data has not lost its privilege, by reason of being transferred to CODES
under the confidentiality agreement.55 (R. 912-913.)
Holding that the CODES database was covered by § 409 because some of its data
came from UDOT broadened the privilege created by § 409 well beyond its intended
meaning and was error. The United States Supreme Court has made clear that § 409 is
"inapplicable to information compiled or collected for purposes unrelated to § 152 and
held by agencies that are not pursuing § 152 objectives." Pierce County v. Guillen, 537
U.S. 129, 145-146 (U.S. 2003). The agency which administers CODES, and the other
organizations to which the data has been provided, are agencies that are not pursuing §
152 objectives.
CODES is operated by the University of Utah's School of Medicine. (R. 441.)
CODES was developed to demonstrate "the feasibility of probabilistic record linkage
using large, statewide databases" and to quantify "the risk of not wearing a seatbelt as it
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pertains to being treated by emergency medical services, treated at the emergency
department, admitted to a hospital, and killed as a result of a motor vehicle crash." Id.
The School of Medicine does not concern itself with § 152 highway funds and the
CODES database is not used to identify, evaluate or plan highway safety improvements.
The data which goes into the CODES database comes from several sources, most
of which have no connection to UDOT or § 152: motor vehicle crash records completed
by police officers at the scene, information collected by UDOT, emergency medical
services runs collected by DOH, emergency department and hospital discharge records
collected from hospitals. (R. at 441-442.) In addition, the CODES research has been
presented to a wide variety of public groups, including the American Public Health
Association, the Association for the Advancement of Automotive Medicine, the
International Forum for Traffic Records and Highway Information Systems, and the
National Congress of Childhood Emergencies. (R. at 443.) The CODES data has been
used to develop traffic legislation on the use of seatbelts in Utah. (R. at 444.)
Certainly, the School of Medicine's CODES database meets the Guillen decision's
definition of "information compiled or collected for purposes unrelated to § 152 and held
by agencies that are not pursuing § 152 objectives." Guillen, at 145-46. As such CODES
should have been made available to the plaintiffs.
Additionally, at the time the 1994 memorandum was prepared, § 409 did not
encompass data or information merely "collected" by UDOT, as with the accident report
data. In Guillen, the Supreme Court held that the 1995 amendment of § 409 to add the
words "compiled or collected" was intended "to have real and substantial effect,"
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broadening the scope of the privilege. 537 U.S. at 145. Accordingly, the trial court's
ruling should not have extended to the 1994 memorandum.
H.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING UDOT TO USE THE
PRIVILEGE UNDER 23 U.S.C § 409 AS BOTH A SHIELD AND A
SWORD, AND IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT NO
ADVERSE INFERENCE SHOULD BE DRAWN FROM THE
ABSENCE OF THE EXCLUDED EVIDENCE.

During oral argument on the Millers' motion to compel, the trial court addressed
the accident history with UDOT's counsel. (R. 1403, 2197.) The trial court directed
UDOT to refrain from arguing lack of evidence, and directed UDOT lo only refer to
information relied upon by the Millers. Id. ("You can't suggest there's no accident
history.") The court further advised UDOT that it could not suggest that the road was
safe based on an accident history to which the Millers. Id. ("You cannot make any
argument at the time of trial based upon accident history that hasn't been provided to
them.")
The order signed by the court which flowed from the oral argument provided that
"neither party should attempt to argue or use the absence of the information as implied or
express proof that there is no such information. Neither party should attempt to take
advantage of the fact that the evidence was excluded or unavailable to Plaintiffs." (R.
1410.) That is consistent with this Court's longstanding disapproval of using a protection
as both a sword and a shield. See, e.g., Combined Metals, Inc. v. Bastian, 71 Utah 535,
267 P. 1020, 1029 (1928) ("plaintiffs ought not now be permitted to beat their shield of
protection into a sword against [the defendant].")
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At trial, however, counsel for UDOT repeatedly introduced accident history
issues. For example:
a.

During its examination of Darin Duersch, UDOT Regional Traffic

Engineer called as a witness by the Millers, UDOT elicited the following testimony
referring to crash history:
It's hard to know whether or not it's a problem or not until we evaluate it
and take a look at the crashes, the frequency...[UDOT staff] do an
analysis that includes, ...geometries, alignment, traffic volumes, median
widths, crash history, all of those things. And then we determine if there
is potential for a project here." They also consider the crash reduction
rate that comes from national and state statistics. They also account for
the number of crashes that could be eliminated as a result of the
proposed change.
(R. 2709, pp. 117-119) (emphasis added).)
b.

In the testimony of David Lee Kennison, UDOT's former Regional

Traffic Engineer, submitted by deposition, the jury heard that UDOT always looked at
accident history in determining the need for median barriers, but he could not remember
how that fit into the criteria. (R. 2709, pp. 252-53.)
c.

In cross-examination of expert witness Ed Ruzak, UDOT, focusing

on the AASHTO national highway safety standards, elicited the following testimony: "A
barrier may not be warranted, again, depending on the cross-median accident history'"
(R. 2710, p. 64 (quoting AASHTO) (emphasis added).) UDOT also addressed crossover
accidents in Mr. Ruzak's testimony in a different case involving a crossover accident and
a failure to have median barriers, emphasizing that when there is a history of crossover
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accidents, the engineer should analyze the history to determine the reasons why and
whether or not should be installed in light of the accident history. {Id., p. 68 - 69.)
d.

In closing argument, UDOT's counsel argued that:

Once a road is built, UDOT just does not turn on the blinders and
ignore things until another project comes along. UDOT constantly
monitors its roads for potential hazards on every level. Every road
in the State of Utah has a maintenance shed that's responsible for
different areas. These roads are patrolled on a daily basis and
looked at on a daily basis. They also obtain information from other
sources, including the highway patrol, the media, from the public
and so forth. They take their job very seriously.
(R. 2712, p. 145 line 16 to p. 146 line 1.)
Later in his argument, UDOT's counsel referred to the AASHTO standards, told
the jury it should find the probability of an accident to be low, and raised the need to
establish a history of accidents:
Likewise for relatively wide medians, the probability of a vehicle
crossing the median is also low - so determine it is low - thus for
median widths greater than 30 feet and with the optional area of the
figure, a barrier may or may not be warranted, again, depending on the
cross-median accident history.
(R. 2712, p. 148 lines 14-20.)
The clear inference of these arguments is that there would be evidence of
accidents at the site if it was dangerous, and that a barrier was not warranted because no
history of accident was presented by the Millers. Of course that was misleading because
convincing evidence of accident history existed that the Millers were prevented from
submitting by the granting of UDOT's motion.

26

Accident history was especially important because the special verdict form asked
in Question No. 1 whether UDOT was negligent in failing to have median barriers in the
gap. (R. 2713, p. 4, lines 12-15.) Showing a history of earlier accidents, exposing an
excessive rate and severity of accidents for the relevant location, was critical to the
Millers' ability to fairly present their case to the jury.
Although parties are afforded considerable latitude in their closing arguments,
"counsel exceeds the bounds of this discretion and commits error if he or she calls to the
jury's attention material that the jury would not be justified in considering in reaching its
verdict." State v. Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606, 615 (Utah Ct.App.1997), qffd, 973 P.2d 975
(Utah 1998)). The absence of accident history evidence was "material that the jury was
not justified in considering," and UDOT was prohibited from bringing that lack of
evidence to the attention of the jury.
Insinuating that evidence not proffered to the jury either exists or does not exist
"encourages the jury to determine its verdict based upon evidence outside the record and
jeopardizes a [party's] right to a trial based upon the evidence presented." State v. Young,
853 P. 2d 327, 349 (Utah 1993). Intimating that there was no history of accident in this
case encouraged the jury to base its verdict on evidence outside the record - and, in fact,
to base its verdict on information that was flatly untrue.
In an attempt to mitigate prejudice from the lack of accident history evidence and
to provide the jury with relevant information upon which to make its decision, the Millers
asked the trial court to instruct the jury that a database with accident history exists, but
that the data is protected under federal law and cannot be submitted to the jury.
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Plaintiffs first raised their concern regarding § 409 being used both as a shield to
exclude evidence and as a sword to attack Plaintiffs case during the discovery phase of
the case. (R. 1156-1157). They again raised their concern that § 409 not be used as both
a shield and a sword during the pre-trial and trial phase. (Addendum 2, pp. 21-24; R.
2708, pp. 6, 10-18.) In a trial memorandum, plaintiffs again described the potential for
prejudice and misuse if an instruction regarding the accident history database was not
given because there was a significant concern that UDOT intended to use the absence of
accident history in its defense. (R. 2196-2200.) UDOT had continually addressed the
lack of accident history as one of its themes during discovery. (R. 2708, pp. 6, 9.)
The original instruction no. Slproposed by plaintiffs read:
During the trial there will be references made by some of the witnesses
to the CARS system or database. This instruction is given to assist you
in understanding those references.
UDOT maintains a computer-based database of the accidents occurring
on State and Federal Roads in Utah ("CARS"). This database is
maintained under federal guidelines for the purpose of receiving Federalaid highway funding for improvements of state and federal roadways.
A federal statute (23 U.S.C. Sec. 409) prohibits accident victims who are
pursuing lawsuits (like the Millers), and their attorneys or experts, from
obtaining or using information from this database. Consequently, you
should not be critical of the Millers for not having that information or of
UDOT for not providing it. (Addendum 3.)
Plaintiffs first submitted this proposed instruction when the trial court and parties
were preparing jury instructions. (R. 2707, p. 5.) At the end of UDOT's argument,
Plaintiffs renewed their motion for a jury instruction at a bench conference and preserved
their objection to the Court's rejection of the instruction on the record:
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The record should reflect that at the bench conference at the close of Mr.
Combe's closing argument we renewed our request for an instruction
concerning the fact that there is a database with the accident history that
is privileged, and therefore, that's why the jury has not heard about it.
Basically we would propose a jury instruction modified slightly from the
one we proposed, eliminating the first paragraph which said during the
trial there would be references made to the CARS program.
Anyway we made that request. Our feeling is that counsel raised that in
closing statement inviting the jury to conclude there was no accident
history. I understand the Court has ruled on it, so this is simply for
purposes of preserving the record.
(R. 2712, p. 16 In 6-22.)
Before trial, the court expressed apprehension about UDOT suggesting that the
lack of evidence regarding accident history might imply that there was no accident
history. (R. 2708, pp. 10-11.) The court observed that "it would be unfair to suggest or
imply that the absence of accidents gives a reasonable inference of safety." (Id., p. 12).
UDOT disagreed, indicated that industry standards concerning the installation of median
barriers require an analysis of the volume of traffic, the width of the median and the
accident history, and that UDOT intended to cross-examine witnesses regarding their
knowledge of accident history. (Id., pp. 12-13). UDOT also asserted that its witnesses
would testify that the lack of barrier meant that there had been a review of accident
history. (Id, p. 14).
The court then cautioned UDOT that if it was going to expressly ask about the
accident history, the court would explain to the jury about § 409, "Because we can't leave
the inference out there that the accident history has been available to both sides and there
was no accident history." (Id, p. 16.) Plaintiffs reemphasized that § 409 was never
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intended to mislead courts and juries, and the court agreed. (Id., p. 16.) The court ruled
that if UDOT opened the door, it would give plaintiffs' proposed instruction regarding
§409: "If you suggest in any way to the jury that there was a clean accident history prior
to 1999...but you've got to be very careful about suggesting in any way to the jury that
there's a clean accident history...That's a problem if you don't want this instruction
given." (Id, pp. 16-18.)
In spite of this clear warning, and the inherent prejudice and unfairness to the
Millers, the trial court ultimately refused to instruct the jury or allow the Millers to
explain why no evidence regarding accident history had been adduced. This error was
highly prejudicial because it misled the jury into thinking there was no accident history, a
key factor in assessing reasonableness, because it unfairly exploited the federally created
evidentiary privilege, and because there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome for Plaintiffs if the error had been corrected by the jury instruction.
"All parties are entitled to have their theories of the case submitted to the jury in
the court's instructions, provided there is competent evidence to support them." Newsom
v. Gold Cross Services, 779 P. 2d 692, 694 (Utah App 1989). Although it is not error for
a court to refuse to give an instruction if the point is properly covered in other
instructions and if the jury instructions in their entirety taken as a whole, fairly instruct
the jury on the law applicable to the case, the accident history was not addressed in any
other instruction, and the jury was not fairly instructed in the law applicable to the case.
Utah Rule of Evidence 507 provides further support for the need to instruct the
jury.

Rule 507(c)(1) establishes that no inference may be drawn from a claim of
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privilege, and Rule 507(c)(3) mandates that "upon request, any party against whom the
jury might draw an adverse inference from the claim of privilege is entitled to instruction
that no inference may be drawn therefrom."

Although UDOT did not claim the

evidentiary privilege created by § 409 in front of the jury, it established its defense on the
benefits of the § 409 evidentiary privilege by drawing inferences before the jury that no
accident history existed from the testimony of witnesses and in its closing argument.
As Rule 507(c)(3) exemplifies, when a jury might draw an adverse inference as a
result of an evidentiary privilege, a jury instruction becomes an entitlement as of right
when requested by the party against whom the inference is drawn. As interpreted by the
trial court, § 409 created such an evidentiary privilege which, given UDOTs argument
and evidence submission, very likely drew the jury into making an adverse inference
against the Millers.
When improper closing arguments are given, reversal is warranted if "this court
concludes that absent the improper argument, there was a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable outcome for the plaintiff." Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62, f 35; 29 P. 3d 638.
Likewise, an error in jury instruction will support a reversal if there is a reasonable
likelihood that the error affected the result. Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp., 862
P. 2d 1342, 1347 (Utah 1993) citing to State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989);
State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992) (jury instruction error supports reversal
if error undermines Court's confidence in verdict).
UDOTs closing argument was improper in that it implied the non-existence of
prior accidents, and the error was compounded by the refusal of the requested jury
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instruction. In this case there is great likelihood that a more favorable outcome would
have resulted because the remainder of the evidence, absent the accident history,
supported Plaintiffs' claim of negligence.
ffl.

IN A SITUATION IN WHICH EVERY POTENTIAL JUROR
FACED AN INHERENT CONFLICT OF INTEREST BY REASON
OF BEING A TAXPAYER AND CONSUMER OF THE ROAD
SYSTEM MANAGED EXCLUSIVELY BY THE DEFENDANT
(UDOT), THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING ONLY
LIMITED COURT VOIR DIRE AND DENYING THE MILLERS'
REQUEST FOR A WRITTEN JURY QUESTIONNAIRE.

This case posed unusual issues regarding potential juror biases.

All of the

potential jurors were tax payers and consumers of UDOT's road system. All potential
jurors therefore had a direct interest in UDOT and its services. Nonetheless, the trial
court did not believe this case presented circumstances that should require a jury
questionnaire. (Addendum 4, pp. 10-11.) Instead, the court expressed concern about the
court's limited financial resources. Id. Even though the trial was scheduled for seven to
eight trial days, when both parties pared down their ant icipated evidence so that it
appeared the matter could be concluded in five days, the court would not change its
position regarding a jury questionnaire.
Numerous Utah opinions have addressed the need for adequate voir dire to make
jury selection meaningful. For example, in Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460 (Utah Ct. App.
1991), the Court of Appeals stated:
Voir dire has two distinct and equally important purposes: the first is to detect
actual juror bias—the basis of a "for-cause" challenge; and the second is to allow
parties to collect sufficient information to intelligently exercise preemptory
challenges.
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[A] trial judge should liberally allow questions 'designed to discover aiu.udo
biases, both conscious and subconscious/ even though such questions go beyo^**
that needed for challenges for cause.
* • *

[Discretion should be liberally exuused m dr.ui ul iilluwin^ i (niiim, I In i I i I
information from prospective ju r ^ ix
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The judge \\u\\ al^o allow counsel the opportunity to hear responses to questions
that may indicate hidden or subconscious attitudes. Without such an opportunity,
the pros - •! ;•r inmanelling a fair and impartial jury is diminished.
He *

*

- 111 tort cases. we cannol i-nmc (IK- reaKu that potential jurors may have
developed tort reform biases as a result ol an overall exposure to such propaganda.
Accordingly, in cases such as this one, the plaintiff has a legitimate interest in
discovering which jurors may have read or heard information generally on tort
reform
*r *

T

In sum,, we believe the trial court shi
ive askec UK >>oicniu..
the questions proposed by [plaintiff] about their
reform...propaganda—not!- • -•'they had been bia^ u^ ''"i
Id. at 462-467 (internal citations omitted).
• It has been the experience ol'plaintills' counsel lliat jurors feel inhibited and even
miiimdiited in /Apress feelings and biases in open m nil, p.iriiuilarlv il ih IM1 ledings

would make it appear that the potential juror cannot be fair or unbiased. In fact, research
has confirmed that on important questions ikif may -*hov,- biases. ^0 to ^0 percent of
jurors do not adequately disclose .

•.

33

•* • ' -

:

,

Swearing With Crossed Fingers, Ut Trial L Assn, Spring 2001, at. 208. Research has
also demonstrated that people are willing to be more candid on written questionnaires
because they feel less inhibited or intimidated. Id.
In today's world, it is imperative that plaintiffs have candid and true feelings
expressed about: (1) tort reform, (2) bias against awarding of general damages, (3) bias
against claims against a state agency in these economically difficult times with publicized
budget shortfalls in the hundreds of millions of dollars, (4) concern that tax payers will
end up paying any damage award, and related issues. Otherwise, challenges for cause
and preemptory challenges cannot be properly made.
A jury questionnaire can be completed in less than 1/2 hour during the morning of
jury selection. Questionnaires can request all of the statutory foundation information,
making voir dire more efficient, allowing the court and attorneys to focus on the jurors
who have given information that may affect a for-cause or preemptory challenge.
Questions addressed to the entire pool in open court require time spent on the entire jury
pool, rather than on those who are likely to be on the jury. Once the requisite number
from the pool have been passed for cause, the court and attorneys need not spend more
time with the remaining members of the pool.
Over the past 15 years, the Court of Appeals has consistently recognized a trial
court's duty to folly explore the issues such as tort reform, and that jury questionnaires
can most effectively accomplish this. The most recent case is Claypoole v. Winward
Electric, Inc., et al., 2010 UT App 77, in which the court stated:

34

Wi agrct ••iUi Plaintiff that there is much to recommend using a ji iry
milii v*.>nnairc in appropriate cases. As has been noted, questionnaires may be
i ui in obtaining a great deal of information about prospective jurors, including
I ices of possible bias, with only a small investment of the trial court's time.
:„.

y j ^ Qlaypoole court cited to the article Attorney Voir Dire and Fury

Questionnaire; Time for a Change, Robert B. Sykes & Francis J Carney I Jtah Bar

Appeals did rule, however, 'that the decision to use a questionnaire is left to the discretion
of the trial court.
Other (iLvi.>um:> u-v* :u ..:
p

-wJi

Hospitals, 2008 UT App 2::\**,

: these issuer. See i %, ALazut v. o ^ ^
;

1" it* VM 400 (noting "rather direct authority md

"prior clear precedents" establishing piauni;.*

^...»ikincn

i.* >• hiu \

'

'

v. Peterson, m?2d

* • *•

-

lirp que^ ons
*JiH

--d Barrett

96 (Utah Ct App. 1993).

In Alcazar, the trial court, reviewed the plaintiffs5 requested voir dire lull declined
to ask lhe question
regarding medical malpractice claims and tort reform. Instead, the court decided to ask
more general questions. Id. , Tflf 5 7 The jury returned a verdict finding the defendant not
negligent.
Hit1 Aliiu"iU omul v\«is very clear as to wh> the trial court's voir dire procedure
was both erroneous and prejudicial.

When the irinl t ourl had asked only general

questions regarding fairness and impartiality dial "was onlv cltectivc in identifying
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proper for-cause challenges," the narrow questioning was insufficient.

The Court of

Appeals held:
The trial court's questions did not allow the plaintiff an opportunity to know
which of the prospective jurors had been exposed to tort reform propaganda,
totally aside from whether the prospective jurors would themselves admit such
exposure had changed their attitudes or biased them. Essentially, we concluded
that the trial judge's line of questions ignored the plaintiffs need to gather
information to assist in exercising her peremptory challenges.
Alcazar, 2008 UT App 222, ^[12 (emphasis in original; citations omitted).
In Barrett, the court again reversed a trial court's refusal to ask about exposure to
tort reform information, depriving the plaintiff of "information necessary both to detect
actual bias and to intelligently exercise his peremptory challenges." Id., % 13, quoting
Barrett, 868 P.2d at 102 n.7. In both Evans and Barrett, the Alcazar court noted, the
plaintiffs had not been given an opportunity to "determine which, if any, prospective
jurors had been exposed to tort reform propaganda, much less whether that exposure
produced hidden or subconscious biases affecting the jurors' ability to render a fair and
impartial verdict." Id. at ^[14.
Alcazar observed that, under Evans and Barrett, "our inquiry does not end once
we have established that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to ask any
meaningful tort reform . . . questions during voir dire." Id. at ^[15. Once a party was
substantially impaired in its right to exercise peremptory challenges, "[w]e will reverse if,
considering the totality of the questioning, counsel was not afforded an adequate
opportunity to gain the information necessary to evaluate the jurors." Id. at ^[15 (internal
citations to quotes omitted).
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Iii Alcazar, the only question the trial court asked, specifically regarding I oil
reform,, was: Has

AH)

ml \uu i m ii i lose Inend ni irliilnr personally lorninl

IIIIIII

opinion

either in favor or opposed to tort reform or been a member of an> organization Uiat ha_."
Id. at ^[18. Most of the other questions were designed 1.- .,nrr*".?r general biases and
prejudice. However, the trial court "allowed the poieni
both illicit expniem i

IMIIIII

Inilni1

•
*%

iiiiiii hospitals

. .
l F ,,%

»

* :^peu:> oi tins

experience." Id. Based on these facts, theyl/ao/* c^-nl concluded thai the "irial mar!
•simply left Plaintiffs' counsel without the necessan .-M>n.wuiw.. ,wcded to lerrei
potential ji n oi 's acti ml bias oi il: : • intelliger

•••-

* a

• i•

prejit idicing Plaintiffs." Id. ' Hie Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for J new -rial
due to the restrictive voir dire Id. at ^f 18-19,
T f

^ ^ pn

equalK

'•..

}

i-s. auurc^;.

!

-^

^ >ed bv the Millers. When the media vvab filled vwili arliucb,

editorials and, political rhetoric about the financial difficulties facing the S1 sk*. i! was
especially imperative thai tilt (rial court explore tiie bia.scs ol piospectivc jurois. III M) I
is insuied In
juror would havi i.
associate any \^n% ;>

through
Miowkduc.
* •»

*•: -

* <• ••*—r-

M r- foreseeable i*».:;

MII»K

;•?> a fact of which a

prospective jurors would

vvith increased taxes or re«iu*.eu sci ; i v i ,

in mmoimiahlr iibsiiu lc In iihliiiM \ im iimil unbiased

IIIIIII V.

i ,u.s w ould be an

"'•

A written questionnaire asking the prospective juror to express his/her feelings,
^ an a treneial quesii*-!!^ being a>ked to the whole group '^ ^ " c h more likely to
unlovei bias ana miormati.

challenge a |iiror

for cause or exercise preemptory challenges. In any event, the trial court should have
explored through appropriate voir dire all aspects of the concerning issues raised above.
This Court has expressed that juries should be given relevant facts and law in
order to allow them to make an informed decision. See, e.g., Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P.2d
591, 596 (Utah 1982). The Millers' proposed jury instruction no. 49 and 55 were
designed to mitigate the inherent conflict that any award would increase taxes or diminish
services. Instruction No. 49 informed the jury that UDOTs exposure is capped by law.
No. 55 explained that any award would not diminish UDOT's services and they should
not speculate where the money would come from to pay the award.
In the economic environment where every juror would have a legitimate concern
regarding the economic and/or tax consequences of its decision, these instructions were
very important. A general instruction that simply says not to consider anything but the
evidence, ignores the reality that every juror is a beneficiary of State services and/or a tax
paying citizen.

Without specific instructions to allay these concerns, the adverse

consequences of an award loomed. This could not help but affect a juror's evaluation and
decision regarding liability.

The proposed instructions would have allowed a juror to

understand that an award will not have such effect and that such considerations should
not be a part of deliberations.
In an analogous situation regarding the effects of apportioning fault, this Court has
held that "[i]f requested, a trial court must inform the jury of the effect of apportioning to
the plaintiff 50% or more of the negligence it finds in a comparative negligence case, if
the effect of such an instruction will not be to confuse or mislead the jury." Dixon v.
38

Stewart, 658 P.2d 591, S%(Utah P>8*!) (overruling Mciiimi v Utah Power & Light i "u>

App. 1988) (allowing retroactive application of the Dixon standard where a motion for a
new trial was pending while Dixon was decided).
The lh\oa

( "oiiil explained line iiiidcilviiii.' |inlk

complex issues affecting the ultimate outcome.

V

bdiititl 111

HIIM IOSIIH

»l

"[JJurors can function properly and

intelligently with full disclosure of relevant law in comparati\'C negligence cases." Dixon
at 597

In overruling AA;u

,* .. ^ o u n touna m.,

McGinn ' r

:;cuiiv

' T the trial and had learned that 'the

jury had confused the issues of negligence and damaucs MU\ were disappointed at the
unexpected legal consequences •: :M--.ir findings

ancl

,*« -

••

»

.;., . w i l reasoned

'5^5 injury verdicts than attempting to blindfold the jury." Id. at 597 (quoting Seppi

v. Betty, 579 P.2d 683, 692 (Idaho ! ^ IKI)
animate rign
informed decision rather than having the JU*v-

^culatc about the effect of its decisions.

These instructions would serve the desired purpose of alleviating or at least minimizing
conf usion, speculation, and undue iiiliuaia; !const:loir, m .lilnjiiisdoiis) uiiisrd h\

n. li

liuor's inherent loinflid of interest.
In today's political climate where extenshi

:
x

rhetoric abounds

regarding the need for liability caps, this proposed instruction wm dl>o numim, v Hie
pc tential advei se bias that a ji it: ;; maj ha <
" ; e , oi
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otherwise make liability and damage decisions that will have the same effect as a cap.
Proposed jury instructions 49 and 55 should have been given to avoid these likely
untoward results.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO EXCLUDE
WITNESSES IN CONFORMITY WITH U.R.E. 615 AFTER
PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST.

At the commencement of the second day of the week-long trial, Plaintiffs
requested the court to apply Rule 615, Ut Rules of Evid. (the witness exclusionary rule).
The trial court judge denied Plaintiffs' request, ruling that a party must invoke the
exclusionary rule at the beginning of the trial or it is waived.
When interpreting an evidentiary rule, courts should "look to the express language
of that procedural rule and to the cases interpreting it." Arbogast Family Trust v. River
Crossings, LLC, 2010 UT 40, ^ 16, 238 P.3d 1035 (internal citations omitted); see also
State ex rel AMD., 2006 UT App 457, ^ 14, 153 P.3d 724 ("Utah courts may look to the
interpretation of federal rules "[t]o the extent that they are similarly worded . . . ."
Arbogast Family Trust, 2010 UT 40, at U 16.
Rule 615 states: "At the request of a party the court shall order witnesses excluded
so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses, and it may make the order on
its own motion." Utah R. Evid. 615(1) (emphasis added).10 The purpose of Rule 615 is
to prevent "witnesses from changing their testimony based on other evidence adduced at

There are some exceptions to the rule; however, none of them apply to the facts of this
case.
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' * ' " State v. Billsie, 2006 I IT 13, f 10, 131 P.3d 239 I he language does not provide a
lmu iivlii'ii a pail) inusl itivoL (he rule.
The plain language of Rule 615 does not support the trial court's ^ Jmr, ' *
Plaintiffs waived the right to invoke the rule since they had not ;TIVOUM • pn>- *°
opening statements. Moreover, appellanis could
has .(I inlcrprclnl llm ianli

I In* plain I.tiii2tua|ie of the rule states "[a]t the request of a

party the court shall order witnesses excluded

" I Jtah R Evid 615(1) (emphasis

added).
(

• .

n.ry raise

the exclusionary rule after a irial has begun. See, t-.g., *t il;«<m I (\>me> Family F.u•<7jr
Pur* Tn4st v CI.R., 958 F 2d 136
time

]

-

,:uihlh,.

J

1/IA

w

r\r

i,

in(y

^ . \i.ihiiia in (he ruL .peciiies a
•••.

. : •

<

V'/A...

* '* , / ij-i-i- \viu ^ii. !!//:>;, i.fc'/*/. denied, 423 U.S. 98/ ^iy,3) ( There i^ no ieu^iu.

rule requiring that a request for separation of w itnesse^ he made at am particular stage of

letliiiiT llial a molinn lo v\\ limit witnesses be made before trial or at any other specific
time. " rherefore, the fact that defendant did not move for exclusion of witnesses under
[Rule] 615 until after the dii ect examination of the stale s second illness lull in nil by

S.W. 2d 632, 634 (Ark. 1992) ("Rule 615 does not specifically require that the
exclusionary request be mad* at anv particular stage of the trial, It need not hi demanded
at the very opening

. i

*

liki when (lit suppoH

arises, the order may be requested."); see also State v. Edwards, 739 P.2d 1325, 1330-31
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) ("There is no general rule that exclusion must be demanded at a
particular time or the availability diminishes."); see also 1 McCormick on Evid. § 50 (6th
ed. 2009) ("A request to exclude witnesses is often referred to as invoking the rule on
witnesses.' No time period is specified in which to make the request.").
In Wood v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 637 F.2d 1188, 1193-94 (8th Cir.
1981), the plaintiff moved to exclude witnesses on the second day of trial. The district
court "denied appellant's motion on the ground that it was not timely made." Id. On
appeal, the court, in dicta, pointed out that "[i]t is clear from the wording of Rule 615 that
generally the exclusion of witnesses so they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses
is required when requested by a party. Rule 615 does not specifically require that the
exclusionary request be made at any particular stage of the trial." Id.
Good policy would support this conclusion. Facts may develop during trial that
make a witness's candid and uninfluenced testimony critically important, which facts
were not deemed significant prior to trial. Unaffected testimony would not prejudice any
party. The law seeks to determine truth which is the ultimate purpose of Rule 615. With
rare exception, the timing of its application is irrelevant.
It is a very difficult task to establish prejudicial error for a trial court's failure to
apply Rule 615, since it is nearly impossible to show how a witnesses' testimony was
influenced by what he or she has heard or seen at trial. It is for this reason that the rule
does not require a party to show good cause or any other predicate before it is applied.
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Its'application is mandatory merely upon request.

Accordingly, llitu, sin nil1! I „i

prcsumplion ol po/iudiual ciroi should llir liinl i ourl cimi HI ills application.
\.

. ':

THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE TRIAL COURT'S ERRORS
DEPRIVED PLAINTIFFS OF A FAIR TRIAL.

Barring Plaintiffs from using evidence not excluded b> § 1 09, alio wing I J D O I to
wrong h nil nil illli llliiil I h n r \\n\ no -iu idnil history

and tvtiisiiiijj lo instruct the

regarding the federal prohibition to Plaintiffs introducing e v i d e n u

f accident In-- »ry.

should undermine this Court's confidence thai I ' i u u t i i ^ r e c e i v e a urn ;>i«
:

cumulali\v tTkrl ol seveial n r o i s mule

-

I lie
* a(-

had, reversal is appropriate. Radman v. Flanders Corp., 2007 UT App. 351, % 20; 1 72 P.
3d 668, citing State v. Kohl "WO TTT ^ * - 5 . 990 p -\? In assessing a c u m u l a t e error
as well

....

5 which may have occurred.'" Id. "The doctrine of cumulative

error allows toi .: nvw trial when slandum alone, no error is severe enough to warrant a
new trial, but when considered iogeilK* *he errors denied the defendant a Ian Inal "
State r h>iw(», K i.i \>.,h\ ly , Wi/ (Ul.ih il>*K|
In 'this ease, the Defendant I)!)()1 w a s allow^; h» v.all the I U I V S attention to the
lack o f evidence concerning HCXKK I\\ history at u , ,» n H n vvhue ine h^ui .* ^ occurred,
even though sin li v\ nlawv cxistnl and I In, IMinnlills v m r barrrd lllituiiuli no Linlt nil llirir
own

fi- om submitting t h ^ evidence. In addition, when "the Plaintiffs souglit to protect

themselves from that misleading, unfair argument, tlu t m l court refused to instruct the
jury as to why no accident history was si-Mt;a .:.
4J

.

,0 urunrousls luled

that the CODES database was protected, that UDOT's witnesses could observe other
testimony and did not adequately address important issues through voir dire or
instruction. The sum of these errors undermines confidence in the verdict, and this Court
should conclude that Plaintiffs were not afforded a fair trial.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, appellants respectfully request the Court reverse
the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial.
DATED this 7th day of January, 2011.
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
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Steven A. Combe, Assistant Attorneys General, represented the Defendant.
The issues having duly been tried and the jury having rendered its verdict, it is hereby
ORDERED and ADJUDGED:
1.

Plaintiffs shall recover nothing from the Defendant, except for the professional fee

of Mr. Ed Ruzak regarding his second deposition and the Order of Fees and Expenses entered by
the Court on or about June 2, 2010.
2.

Defendant shall recover from Plaintiffs their allowable costs in this action, subject

to Rule 54 (d)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
3.

This action shall be dismissed on the merits.
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P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on May 10, 2010)

3

THE COURT:

4

I of Miller vs. UDOT.

5
6

State your appearances, please

MR. HUMPHERYS.

My name is Rich Humpherys for the

plaintiff, and beside me is Roger Christensen, co-Counsel.

7
8

Well, let's go on the record in the matter

MS. STEINVOORT:

Sandra Stemvoort and Steve Combe on

behalf of Utah Department of Transportation.

9

THE COURT:

10 I here this morning.

All right.

Everybody looks happy to be

You're not under any stress, I take it.

11

Good.

We've got a number of motions that have been filed.

12

Let's address the motions first.

13

no particular order, and we'll just take them in the order that I

14

have them listed in.

15

I sort of have them listed in

The first motion I'd like to address is UDOT's motion

16 I in limine, and this deals with a couple of issues.
17

First of

all, it deals with the revised report that has been submitted by

18 I Mr. Ruzak that is different from his original report.
19

Apparently

mostly based upon the fact that he apparently very reasonably

20 I assumed that mileage markers are mileage markers and they stay
21

the same, and wasn't aware that the mile markers had been changed

22

on 1-15.

23

I guess my view about this is that it would just be

24 I grossly unfair to exclude his revised opinions to the extent that
25 I they're based upon him coming to an understanding that the mile

-31 I markers had changed in this case, and so the accident actually
2 I occurred at a somewhat different place than what he originally
3 1 believed.
4

I

It doesn't appear to me that UDOT acted improperly

5

I in withholding that information.

6

I specifically requested.

7

I fault the plaintiffs for not having a specific interrogatory to

I don't think it had been

On the other hand, I certainly can't

8 I address the issue of whether the mile markers had ever changed.
9 I I mean that's ]ust something that I don't think would have
10 1 occurred to me

So I think it's fair to allow him to revise his

11 I report.
12

The only real issue is is UDOT prejudiced by that, and

13

what can we do to ameliorate that prejudice

If what you're

14

telling me is all you need to address that is to be able to call

15 I your four lay witnesses, I think that that's an easy call.
16

think that we allow Mr

17

accordance with his revised report.

18

you need to respond to that, you'd be allowed to call those

19 I witnesses.
20

I

Ruzak to revise his report and testify in
If those are the witnesses

Any additional argument you want to make about that,

Ms. S t e m v o o r t 7

21

MS

STEINVOORT:

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. HUMPHERYS:

No, your Honor.

You're okay with that, Mr. Humpherys?
We've resolved the issue of those four

24

witnesses by having UDOT indicate they would call only one of

25

three, and that's the only one they have now designated as their

1 I trial witness.
2

He has been deposed as of last Friday.

I don't

know -- is UDOT changing their position as to the other three?

3

MR. COMBE:

No.

4

MR. HUMPHERYS:

So we're only talking about one.

That

5 I motion to exclude those four have been -- has been resolved
6

I accordingly.

7

THE COURT:

All right.

So Mr. Ruzak can testify in

8 I accordance with his revised report.

UDOT can respond with the

9 I witness they've designated.
10 I

The other aspect of this motion in limine is the

11 J markings on the barriers.

I think that there's a little

12 1 confusion here, at least I see it differently than the way UDOT
13 I has framed the issue to me.

I don't think that it's a Rimmasch

14 I issue of him -- of Mr. Ruzak looking at those pictures and coming
15

to the inference that those pictures reflect collisions between

1 6 I automobiles and the barrier.

I haven't seen the pictures yet,

17 I but it seems to me that that's not so much his opinion as it is
18
19 I

one of the bases of his opinion.
An expert can rely as a basis of his opinion on anything

2 0 I that would be customarily relied upon by experts in the field.
21

So if Mr. Ruzak lays the foundation that observations of this

22

kind are the sort of thing that experts in the field would

23

customarily rely on, then I think he's allowed to use that as

24 I part of the basis of his opinion and testify accordingly.
2 5 I you want to address further, Ms. Steinvoort?

Do
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MS. STEINVOORT:

2

THE COURT.

Mr. Combe^

3

MR. COMBE:

Your Honor, I would agree with that.

4
5 I

It's actually Mr. Combe's motion.

I

don't have a problem with that.
THE COURT:

All right.

So assuming there's a proper

6 I foundation laid at trial, he can so testify.
7

The next one that I have is plaintiff's motion in limine

8 1 No. 3, and that is a motion to exclude the reference to any fault
9 I of Jacquelyn Neal.

I've got to tell you, Mr. Humpherys, that

10 I it's my view that Utah's comparative fault statute reflects a
11 I policy decision on the part of the legislature that fault in the
12 I broadest sense will be considered, and that liability will be
13

limited to the proportionate fault attributed to a particular

14

defendant.

15

make fault as all inclusive as possible, and to limit recovery to

I think the statute is drafted in such a way as to

16 I the proportionate fault attributable to a particular defendant
17 I

I think it would be -- clearly go against the express

18 I policy of the legislature not to submit the issue of Jacquelyn
19

Neal's fault to the jury in this case.

I think that the argument

2 0 I that you've made that there would be no accident at all if the
21 I road had been properly designed and if there had been a barrier
22 I median, it's a good argument, but it's an argument that any fault
2 3 I assessed to Ms. Neal should be minimal, if any, but it doesn't
24 I prevent the issue from going to the jury.

I'll hear any

25 I additional argument you want to make about that.
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MR. HUMPHERYS:

2

THE COURT:

No, nothing further.

All right.

The next issue that I have is

3 I plaintiff's motion in limine No. 2 to exclude any reference to
4

plaintiff's settlement with the estate of Neal.

Let me ask UDOT

5

I in this case if there's a belief that the settlement reflects on

6

I the credibility of any witness at trial.

7

I the settlement reflect the bias of any witness?

In other words, does
Could any

8 J witness be impeached by bias as a result of this settlement?
9
10

MS. STEINVOORT:
THE COURT:

I'm thinking.

All right, then.

No, probably not.
It seems to me that

11

the only issue that is left is kind of the difficult issue that

12

both sides face of how the jury will handle really a lack of

13 I information that they are going to have regardless of what we do.
14 I
15

I think the plaintiff's concern is that if the jury is
told about the settlement -- of course the jury would not be told

16 I the amount of the settlement -- the jury may go back to the jury
17 I room and speculate that plaintiffs have already received a
18 I recovery and therefore minimize the recovery that the plaintiffs
19 J would receive in this case.
20

On the other hand, if there is no disclosure of the

21 I settlement, I think the defendants can reasonably be concerned
22

that we're going to tell the jury that the only damages that

23

UDOT will be assessed will be based upon the proportionate fault

24

assessed to UDOT.

So they'll be wondering in their minds, "Well,

2 5 I does that mean that there was no recovery for any percentage of

1 I fault that is assessed to Ms. N e a P "
2

I think that that's a

reasonable concern, and I think that's part of the reason why

3 I the general rule is that you notify -- you inform jurors of the
4 I existence of a settlement, but not the amount.
5 I

I've thought a little bit about this.

This is an

6 I instruction that sort of, I think, addresses my concerns about
7 I that -- what the jury may be likely to speculate about.

I'd like

8 I you to both take a shot at -- assuming that I'm going to notify
9

I the jury in some fashion of the existence of a settlement -- how

10 I it should be done.

This is what I would propose, or something

11 I along this line.
12 I
13

"You have been instructed that UDOT's liability, if any,
is limited to the percentage of fault allocated to it.

Do not

14 I speculate whether plaintiffs have or will recover damages for any
15 I fault allocated to Jacquelyn Neal.
16

It is enough for you to know

that any issues between plaintiffs and Ms. Neal's estate have

17 I been addressed and resolved separately."
18

MS. STEINVOORT:

If -- let me just -- excuse me

19 I could just pull out the instruction that I've prepared.

If I
In fact,

20 I may I -21

THE COURT:

Sure.

Anyway, I guess the bottom line is

22

I'm inclined to notify the jury in some fashion, coupled with

23

an instruction, not to speculate on what's going to happen with

24

respect to any fault allocated to Ms. Neal.

25

more argument on that, Mr. Humpherys?

You want to make

-81

MR. HUMPHERYS:

Argument might not be the right word,

2

but we would invite the Court to share that instruction with us,

3

and Counsel from both sides can look at it more carefully and

4 I scrutinize it.
5

If we were to give such an instruction, it would

be our request that that instruction be given at the commencement

6 I of the trial because there's just no way -- it's like the
7

I elephant in the room, but nobody's talking about.

There's --

8 I I believe that that needs to be somehow addressed, and then it
9 I needs to be incorporated in a way that Counsel on either side
10 I cannot raise the issue or address the issue or imply or suggest
11 I either through witnesses or through argument anything other than
12 I what the Court has stated.
13

THE COURT:

14 I morning.

Well, I just typed this up myself this

It's not well punctuated.

I would have put in some

15 I commas, done some other things, but why don't you -- could you
16 I make a couple of copies of that?
17 I think about.
18

It will give you something to

I'm sure it can be improved.

say anything about that particular motion?

Anybody else want to
Plaintiff's motion in

19 I limine No. 1 with respect to insurance, it doesn't sound like
2 0 I that's disputed.
21
22

Everybody agrees on that?

The motion with respect to the jury questionnaire, let
me just ask you, Mr. Humpherys, how logistically at this point

2 3 ] would you handle a questionnaire?
24
25

MR. HUMPHERYS:

At this point when they come in I -- I'm

not sure exactly when the jurors are called in, but I understand

1 I they're called in sometime around 8 or 8*30, which is before the
2 I time which they -- when they come up here to the courtroom.

I

3 J understand we're starting at 9.
4

THE COURT:

5

MR. HUMPHERYS:

6

We're starting at 8:30.
At 8 30, all right

So I don't know

what time they would have in the jury -- the general jury pool,

7

I but if they come in you could request that the jury pool come

8

I in even earlier than 8:30, allow the jurors to fill out this

9 I questionnaire.

I don't think it would take more than 15 minutes,

10

20 at the most, and the Court can then request some general basic

11

information as the Court typically does.

12 I

In the meantime the clerk can make copies of the

13 I questionnaires and allow a break after the Court has concluded
14 I its general basic foundational questions, allow us to go through
15 I them quickly, and then we'd proceed with more specific questions
16

in voir dire.

I think the Court has indicated that the Court

17 I does not allow attorney voir dire.

I would urge that if we don't

18 I have a questionnaire that attorneys be allowed to voir dire the
19 I prospective jurors.
20

I think this jury questionnaire, given its shortness

21 I and yet the importance to us to intelligently exercise both our
22 I challenges to cause as well as to the peremptory, we believe we'd
23

need to have this additional information.

I think it will short

24

circuit much of the open voir dire.*

25

dire has to go through oftentimes each witness individually where

In fact, the Court in voir

-101

that now can be avoided, at least on certain issues.

2

a question of whether someone's comment in open court might

3

engender some kind of feelings by others.

4

that to be handled without such influence one way or the other.

5

There is

This again allows

I would assume that UDOT would want to have the same

6

kind of information available to them.

7

governmental agency, it is a common issue to both sides, and

8

there are some people that do not care for government.

9

are some people who feel the opposite, that government should be

10

immune from any kind of claim regardless of the law, concern for

11

the tax consequences and so forth.

12
13

The fact that it's a

There

So a jury questionnaire such as this does allow some
of the more difficult issues to be addressed outside of the group

14 i as a whole, and then as the parties and/or the Court has more

i

15

specific questions, we can handle those in chambers again without

1

16

having that influence to the general body.

So that's how I would

1

17

propose it.
How long do you think it would take you to

18

THE COURT:

19

review those questionnaires?

20

people, I think, for this trial.

21

MR. HUMPHERYS:

I mean we're going to summon 40

We have two Counsel, I think, that are

22 I going to be trying the case on both sides.

I think we could

23 1 probably do that within 20 minutes.
24 I

THE COURT:

Now I'm not as a general rule opposed to the

25 I use of jury questionnaires.

I generally reserve them for cases,

]
1

-111 I though, where there is concern about pre-trial publicity or
2 I some particularly sensitive information that people would be
3 ] particularly reluctant to talk about in open court during the
4 I course of voir dire.
5 |

What you're proposing, there's no question that it
would ultimately result in a much longer voir dire process,
even with the fact that some questions might be -- some oral
questions might not be necessary because of what we went through.

9 I I just really don't see anything about this case

that raises

10

particularly difficult issues to address in typical oral voir

11

dire.

12 I

In contrast to my feelings about jury questionnaires,

13 I I have pretty strong feelings about attorney conducted voir dire
14 I When I was in practice I tried cases in jurisdictions where that
15 I was the rule.

I've also been to -- as a lawyer to seminars where

16 I trial tactics were taught, and there were classes given in
17

attorney conducted voir dire.

18 I

In Nevada, for example, attorney conducted voir dire

19

takes hours or days, and everything -- it's basically open

20

season, and it's got nothing to do with picking an impartial

21 I jury.

It has much more to do -- and this is way it's actually

2 2 I taught in trial practice seminars is that this is your
23

opportunity to introduce the themes of your case, and this is

24 I your opportunity to commit jurors to look at the case from a
25

particular perspective.

All of that has got nothing to do with

-121 I picking an impartial jury.
2

I

It's my view, with all due respect to the lawyers

3

I present here, which I have enormous respect for, but nevertheless

4 I my view that I'm the only person in the room interested in
5

picking an impartial jury.

Everybody else wants to pick a

6

I partial jury.

So I really try hard not to just do a perfunctory

7

I voir dire.

8

I chance to express any concerns they have about whether they can

9

I be fair in a particular case.

I really try hard to be probing and give everybody a

If I don't cover something

10 I adequately enough, if you tell me at the time, I'll try again.
11 I I'm not inclined to depart from my usual practice in this case.
12

I think we've covered the motion relating to the lay

13 I witnesses.

That really just leaves the motion with respect to

14 I attorney's fees and expenses.

The way I propose to handle that

15 I is I think that it would be helpful for me to make that decision
16 I after I've heard the evidence, after I've heard Mr. Ruzak
17 I testify, after I've seen what exhibits came into evidence and
18

maybe can identify what exhibits were part of the more recently

19 I produced documents and how important they were to the case.
20

Unless somebody really has an objection to that and really wants

21

a decision now, I would like to have another hearing on that

2 2 I after the trial and give you a chance to argue that at that time.
2 3 I Anybody have a problem with that?
24

MS. STEINVOORT:

25 I

MR. COMBE:

No.

No, your Honor.

1
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THE COURT:

2

MR. H U M P H E R Y S :

Is that okay with you, Mr.
Well,

it's one more thing we have

3

deal with after the trial -- post trial hearings

4

to be dealt with, I g u e s s , one way or the other.

5

Ilonor,

that if the Court desires and if there's

evidentiary

to

-- but it has
I g u e s s , your
specific

questions that need to be asked of Mr. Ruzak,

could either be questioned

10

Humpherys?

at a time when the jury

he

is out while

he is here, or perhaps we could do it by telephone.

I don't

a problem

to

taking the stand under oath ai id submitting

have

questions

as w e l l .

11

I appreciate the delicate balance and the

detail

12

associated with this, and it's no exact science to be able to say

13

what additional time -- or let's roll back time and assume

1 4:

had all the documents

15

how does the picture

] 6

I'm

II 7

t h e C o u r 1: desires , I:> i I t - -

]8

THE C O U R T :

and roll forward, how does it look
look today.

T know

you

versus

it's a difficult

issue.

happy to submit additional evidence by way of testimony,

I'm

sure that I'm

going to need

if

additional

]9

testimony

20

produced

21

description of that in these p a p e r s , but I haven't

2?

documents yet, and I haven't got the factual context that both of

so much as

just an understanding

documei Its f it ii 11:o the case ..

of how the

recently

I' ve seen sort of the

; you have having heard the evidence in the case,

and

seen

the

I think

even

without hearing additional e v i d e n c e , just being able to put it in
the context

of being more

familiar with the record and the

case

•14-

1 I would help me make a more intelligent decision about that.
2

MR. HUMPHERYS:

3

then have it after the trial.

4

THE COURT:

5

All right.

Thank you.

I think that covers

all the motions.

6 J
7

Well, in light of that it makes sense to

MR. HUMPHERYS:

Your Honor, there is an additional issue

| which Counsel are very aware of.

It has to do with Jacquelyn

Neal, and let me kind of put this in context because this will be
a focus of one of the primary issues in the trial.

The Court

10 I should be aware of it, and I think we want to raise an issue with
11

the Court and Counsel, and we can address that as we move along.

12 I

That has to do with Mrs. Neal's state of mind at

13

the time of the accident.

14

background.

15

after.

16

to --

17

Let me give the following factual

I understand you have your next hearing at a quarter

I'm respectful of that.

THE COURT:

I don't think it will take long

Don't worry about it.

We can also -- this

18 I can take as long as it needs.
19

MR. HUMPHERYS:

All right.

Jacquelyn Neal was a 57-

2 0 I year-old lady, very conservative in her general nature and
21

personality.

She was leaving a family gathering, a reception,

22

a 50th wedding anniversary of her sister.

23

with her; he was tied up in work.

24

witnesses that we have talked to, she was fine.

2 5 I expressed any concern.

Her husband was not

She left Bountiful, and from
She never

Certainly no hurry was being -- no

-15expedience had anything to do with her talk and her nature.

It

was all relaxed.
She is a diabetic, has been for approximately 40 years,
'he left Bountiful and traveled to the Roy area where her -•he Layton/Roy area where her home is.

Sometime prior to the

iccident something happened to her, and she began to act very
.nationally.

Witnesses describe her traveling between 85 and 95

Ttiles an hour on the shoulder of the road, darting in and out,
weaving, and then at this particular point where there were no

10

median barriers she went straight across the median and hit my
clients head on.
The -- UDOT his hired Dr. Barry Benowitz, one of the

13

renowned local doctors in the area of diabetes.

14

her medical records, both previous and at the time of the

15

accident.

16

time after the accident.

17

aware of the irrationa 1 ki i id of dr:i vi i I :f behavior that she was

18

involved in at the time of the accident.

19

that she suffered from a hypoglycemic event which is a low blood

20

s

21

state of consciousness.

22

An autopsy I believe was done.

He has reviewed

She lived for a short

Various tests were taken.

He was also

It is his conclusion

a n d a s a r e s u l t h a d a m i n d a J t e r :i n j o r m e n t: a 1 a J t e r i n g

There are two -- at least two Utah cases, one directly
on point where a particular defendant was beii ig sued who rai I i nto

24

a parked car and injured people.

25

diabetic and that he went into a state of altered consciousness

His defense was that he was a

-161

I and was not able to control his ability to d r i v e .

2

|

3

I no cause of action as a result of the diabetic c o n d i t i o n .

4

I was appealed

5

The verdict came back

and the Utah Supreme Court considered

I and upheld

7

I requisite

8

I it was affirmed

9

I become a central

10

it stating that

jury

along with the jury instructions.

I Utah Comparative

13

I it back.

14

I think, after.
was

Fault

As a result

So this

will

N o , they were both b e f o r e .

N o , I take
That w a s , I

I think it was 1987 when the comparative

first enacted.

the

Act?

The second one, I b e l i e v e , was in 1991.

It may be before

I amendments

17

I was the second case that referred

18

I and upheld it.

19

I

to the comparative

the amendment

fault.

I'm

--

to this specific

d e f e n s e " -- the defendant' s defense

--

vx

"(Inaudible)

is based on a rule of

I that if a person driving an automobile

22

I illness that he or she has no reason to a n t i c i p a t e , and

23

I illness m a k e s

24

that person

is not liable

1993

line of law

21

it impossible

fault

recent

sorry, it was

It states -- the Utah Supreme Court states,

I accident."

mental

Were either of those cases decided after

16

25

facts

issue.

MR. H U M P H E R Y S :

15

fault implies some necessary

ability to control one's ability to d r i v e .

THE C O U R T :

12

20

the

It

i n s t r u c t i o n s , which were associated with that case and the

6

11

in favor of the defense as a

is suddenly

law

stricken by an

for him or her to control

the

the car,

for negligence associated with

the

-171 |

Now there will be jury instructions associated with

2

that.

The third motion in limine dealt with the concept in a

3

different light.

I appreciate there are going to be issues of

1 J fact regarding this, and so we did not base any motion of her
fault because of her diabetic condition, because it is also part
1

if

the law that if the person who suffered from such condition

iad some kind of notice or knowledge that he or she might have
" ! ;uch a condition if medications were not taken or proper diets
.vere not adhered to and so forth, that there could be fault
J '•) | issociated with that as opposed to at the moment of accident
:

i //nether speeding and/or lane changing or loss of control was the
i ictual fault.

13 I

UDOT has developed that part of the theory and has

14

taken that position of the husband of Mrs. Neal.

15

of Mrs. Neal indicated that Mrs. Neal years earlier had had an

16

episode similar to this where she was pulled over by some law

I/

enforcement officer thinking that she may be drunk or having some

18

other problem -- under the influence of drugs or whatever.

19

the officer determined that she was suffering from a diabetic

"Z 0

The husband

Once

c o i i d i t i o i I / h e s u g g e s t e d t h a t s h e n o t: i i s e h e r d r :i ver's license,

21

and there's controverted issue whether it was actually suspended

22

or not.

' - |
24

A s fa r a s w e c a i I d e t e r m i n e i t w a s i i o t s u s p e ride d, b i 11

we're still trying to verify that with the driver's license

2 5 I division.

But at least as of 2002 there was no suspension, no

-181 I citations, no improper driving record nor qualifications on her
2

I driving.

He treating doctor on the diabetes, her -- his records

3 I do not indicate any such thing that he was consulted, that he
4 I had concerns, that he issued any kind of report (inaudible) her
5

to drive, yet the husband believed -- and this is going to be

6 I part of the reason I'm addressing this with the Court is a prior
7

I bad act under Rule 404.

I'm going to ask my partner, Roger

8 I Christensen, to address the law as it relates to that point, but
9
10
11 I
12

I'm giving the factual background because I'm more familiar with
it.
So we have a situation where I think even a police
officer, which has been designated as a witness by UDOT,

13 I indicated that he recalls someone erratically driving and he
14 I pulled her over and it was Mrs. Neal.
15

He thought that the

driver's license was suspended or pulled or something until a

16 I medical report could be submitted.
17 I

The husband said that after a few months when the doctor

18 I continued to help her with her medical condition, he then thought
19

it was appropriate to give her a driver's license, and then

2 0 I certified to the State that she was capable of driving, and at
2 1 I that point in time supposedly according to the husband the
22 I driver's license is given back to her.
23
24

That was years before,

and as far as we can tell there have been no problems since.
So there are a number of issues that surround that

25 I factual basis.

Since it does deal with a core issue in the case,

-191 I i.e , the fault of Mrs. Neal as compared to UDOT's, we need to
2 I address that and have it in our minds because there will be a lot
3

of evidentiary issues that surround that during the course of

4 I trial, depending on how the witnesses may or may not testify.
5 I

There's certainly a lot of hearsay, double hearsay and

6 I triple hearsay associated with the factual assertions that UDOT
7

I wishes to present to the ]ury, both in opening and in the course

8 I of evidence, all of which are going to be carefully monitored by
9 I us, objected to when appropriate and addressed, so we felt the
10 I Court needed to be aware of this.

With the Court's -- if the

11 I Court would please, I would like to ask Roger to talk about Rule
12 I 404 and how we believe it would apply in this case so that we can
13

then address it appropriately.

14

THE COURT:

Sure.

15

MR. CHRISTENSEN-

I'd be happy to hear that.
Thank you, your Honor.

So I'm sure

16 I the Court recognizes relatively new to being involved more than
17 I just on a minimal level on this, and I've been -- tried to get
18 J up to speed on this case, Rule 404(b) talks about other crimes,
19 I wrongs or acts.

It says, "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or

20 I acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in an
21 I order to show action in conformity therewith."
22
23
24

It says it can be

admissible for other purposes.
Conceptually, though, it's simply you can't show that
someone was negligent several years before and therefore the jury

25 I should consider that that may be evidence they were negligent at

-201 I the time in question
2

THE COURT:

I don't think that's the point.

I mean

3

it sounds to me like that history relates to notice to her of

4

possible limitations on her ability to drive.

You know, it isn't

5 I ultimately the State's responsibility to identify when someone
6 I has a physical condition that makes them incapable of driving
7

safely or puts them at risk of not driving safely.

I think the

8 I State has a role in that and they attempt to screen people out of
9
10 I

that.
Ultimately it's the driver's responsibility to look at

11 I their own abilities.

In the case of a diabetic, they need to

12

know how well their diabetes is controlled and how frequently

13

they have episodes, and this would just simply be notice to her

14

that there is a potential problem there that she needs to make

15

sure that her diabetes is well controlled before she gets behind

16 I the wheel of a car.

It's not propensity evidence.

It's not

17 I evidence of a trait of character, it's just notice evidence.
18

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

1 9 I This is our concern.

I think the Court is correct on that.

Certainly the defense in this case is

20 j entitled to present evidence that this woman was a diabetic and
2 1 I that she knew she was, and that she should have been properly
22

taking care of herself.

'When it though goes beyond that issue

23

to -- now let me tell you about something really bad that would

24 I scare anybody on a jury that happened more than two years before
2 5 I this incident.

-211
2

I

The d e t a i l s , she was driving erratically, pulled over,
had a discussion with the police officer, or there was

3

I event where she got hypoglycemia

4

I of a mall and not real

5

I found h e r .

6

I prejudicial.

7

I the probative value

8
9

and ended up in a parking

functional mentally.

lot

Her family came and

When you get into that kind of detail it becomes
I think it gets into Rule 4 0 3 , and that is whether
is outweighed by the p r e j u d i c e .

So our

thought would be you get into the specifics of these prior
I it becomes prejudicial

10
11

another

for obvious

events

reasons.

On the other hand, to say she was a diabetic,
I was aware of it and I think it was 42 years she had had

she
this

12

condition, she needed to take her m e d i c a t i o n s , control her diet

13

and take all of that into account

14

problem with that.

15

and the details of those that we think

16

THE COURT*

in driving a car, we have no

It's when they get into specific

All right.

the problem a r i s e s .

I'm going to have to give

17

I some consideration, but I appreciate

18

I for me to have a heads up on that issue.

19

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

20

I I'm

here, I've

21

1 case myself, may I address
THE C O U R T :

23

MR

25

-- I think it's very

that
helpful

There is one other that if I may while

thought just in trying to get up to speed on this

22

24

instances

that?

Sure.

CHRISTENSEN:

I know there is the -- there's a

federal database that contains accident h i s t o r y .

I think

there's

I a federal regulation that says it's not to be used in courtrooms.

-221

I think that's the CARS program, if I understand it.

As I have

2

looked at the record in this case, I think there's been some

3 I ruling by the Court that we can't get into evidence from CARS
4 I database.
5

In fact, I don't think we're even allowed to discover

it.

6

I

On the other hand, some accident history has been

7

I provided through other sources.

This is more of a practical

8 I issue, your Honor, that I throw out for the Court and for Counsel
9

to consider, more of a practical issue than a legal one per se.

10 I The defense is centering on just how extensive was the accident
11

history, how many accidents have the plaintiffs been able to find

12

in this area, and so forth.

13

This is the concern.

If there's going to discussion

14 I in this trial -- and it seems to me it's inevitable that there
15

will be -- of accident history, and yet the main database for

16 I that accident history has been put off limits by federal law,
17 I that could get very confusing for a jury, and even not very
18 I practically workable for Counsel.
19

I'm wondering if the jury

could simply be told what is going on, and that is there is a

2 0 I federal database.
21
22

As part of federal law that can't be used in trials, so
you're told it's there.

That has not been made available to the

2 3 I parties, and that's because we're all bound to follow the law,
2 4 I but you're not to draw any negative inference against UDOT for
25

I withholding that evidence.

That's again what the law requires.

-231 I By -- on the other hand, as witnesses talk about accident history
2

I or the lack of it, it needs to be fair game to say well, this is

3

I only a partial history we've been given.

4

I there may not.

5

I don't see how we honor that federal statute if we're

6
7

There may be more,

talking about accident history.

That's something that I think

I all of the engineers have said they routinely review, take into

8

account in making decisions on median barriers.

9 I admitted that.
10

Everybody has

We can't use it in the case.

As I say, I think it's going to be very confusing to

11

the jury not to simply be told why there's something there that

12

is routinely used but they're not hearing about it.

I raise

13 I that as an invitation for us to, if we can, agree on a practical
14 I solution, the jury

not

just be kept totally in the dark but be

15

told what's going on, and then the parties do what they need to

16

to obey federal law, but to minimize the confusion created out of

17

it.

18 I

THE COURT:

Why don't you propose an instruction'?

19

MR. CHRISTENSEN.

All right.

I think -- and I haven't

2 0 I made -- of course, not just an instruction, but also some agreed
2 1 I approach to choose during trial during examination of witnesses
2 2 I as well.
23
24

THE COURT:

So your concern, as I understand it, that

given the importance of accident history to the decision of

2 5 I whether or not there should have been a median in this place,

-241 I you're concerned that the jury will come to the assumption that
2

whal ever accident history they're provided is -- represents the

3 I entLre accident history, which may or may not be the case,
4

I and the reason we don't know whether or not it's the case is

5 j because -- actually, I think it's a state database that is
6

protected by federal law, it simply isn't accessible and not

7 I useable in this courtroom.
8

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Right.

I would think UDOT would have

9 I the other concern I raise, though, and that would be in fairness
10 I we get to say, "Well, we don't know if this is complete because
11

we can't see your database, the one you use,'' and then UDOT' s

12 I going to say, "Well, it's not fair to infer that we somehow acted
13

improperly in withholding this evidence because that's -- the law

14 I requires us to."
15

So something that allows the jury it's there, nobody has

16

done anything wrong here.

The plaintiffs haven't been derelict

17

by not doing their homework on it.

They haven't been derelict by

18 I withholding it, but that database is there and it's off limits,
19 I and therefore you need to weigh any evidence upon accident
2 0 I history with that in m m d .
21

MR. COMBE:

Your Honor, may I address that 9

22

THE COURT:

You can address anything that has been said

23

by either Counsel.

I'm going to give you a chance to do that

24 j now.
25 I

MS. STEINVOORT:

Your Honor, I'd like to address

-251 I Mrs. Neal's prior history.
2 I

THE COURT:

Sure

I'm not going to decide anything on

3 J those issues today, but I think it's fair that you get a chance
4 I to speak to it now if you'd like to
5

MS. STEINVOORT.

6

years.

7

take her insulin.

She was a type I diabetic, which meant she had to

8 I documented.
9

Mrs. Neal was a diabetic for 43

Her incident in 2002 -- in March of 2002 was

Her license was revoked.

Coincidentally, the same

trooper who responded to the fatality accident in this case was

10

the trooper who pulled her over.

11

history of her losing her license for a period of time.

12 I

So we do have a documented

Dr. Benowitz (inaudible) that she would always tell her

13 I physician or treating doctor that in fact she was fine, there was
14

nothing wrong, but the family observed her doing things such as

15

driving off and not being located for hours and then finding her

16

in a parking lot.

17

her insulin needs.

18 I

She wasn't particularly good about monitoring

There is case out of Tennessee

19 I last year involving another diabetic.

(Inaudible) had a case
It was our employee.

He

20 I did a lot of research as to the foreseeability issue, and that's
21

really the key here, whether it was foreseeable.

The idea of a

22

person not being attributed any fault is for an unforeseeable

23

situation.

24

complete an annual exam by her physician to be submitted to the

Mrs. Neal knew she was a diabetic, knew she had to

25 I driver's license department.
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She -- and the factors that the Tennessee court that

2 1 I found -- the case from Tennessee that I found discussed the
3 I following

"Extent of driver's awareness or knowledge of her

4 I condition that caused sudden impairment, whether the driver was
5

under the medical care of a physician, whether the driver was

6 j prescribed to a medication for the condition, whether sudden
7

I incapacity had previously occurred while driving, number,

8 j frequency, extent and duration of previous incapacity, temporal
9

relationship of prior incapacitating episodes, position of

10

(inaudible) regarding driving and the medical opinion regarding

11

adherence and foreseeability of incapacity."

12
13

So there are factors to look at.

I think Mrs

Neal

knew, as did her family, that she really wasn't a very safe

14 I driver, and it was just a matter of time where this tragedy is
15

going to happen with her because she didn't want to give up her

1 6 j license.
17

Her husband said he would come home and find her in a

18 I stupor vacuuming the same spot or washing the same dish over and
19 I over.

She was oblivious to where she was.

Her eyes would be

2 0 I open, she looked like she was okay, but she wasn't with us, so to
21

speak.

When Mr. -- or Dr. Benowitz was deposed, Mr. Humpherys

22

said, "Well, how do we know she wasn't starting to develop

23

dementia or something 9 "

Dr. Benowitz noted that as soon as you

24 I gave her food she would come out of it.
25 I

So the foreseeability here is I think clearly met.

She

-271 I knew she had a problem, and she didn't take very good care of it.
2

Just to sort of describe this lady, we're not -- she was also

3

I convicted of embezzling, and we're not going to talk about

4

I because that's not, you know, necessary to discuss her -- of

5

that, but in terms of her ability to drive, the foreseeability

6 ] of her medical problems and her likelihood of impairment, I think
7

it's well established and I think the jury needs to know that she

8

knew about it and didn't take proper precautions.

9

We do have, by the way, an entire file of her driving

10

history.

I didn't bring it with me because I didn't know this

11

issue would be addressed today, but I don't think it would be

12

fair to suggest that she was unaware of her medical problems.

13

MR. HUMPHERYS:

14

MS. STEINVOORT:

15
16
17

Well, it's just -- it's the driver

license stuff we've all talked about.
MR. HUMPHERYS:

Well, I know, but we have searched to

try and find out if her license was revoked and we haven't been

18 I able to find it.
19

We need to get those documents.

So if you --

MS. STEINVOORT:

Just through a GRAMA request, so I will

2 0 I share that with you.
21

MR. HUMPHERYS:

22

THE COURT:

Mr. Combe?

23

MR. COMBE:

Your Honor, on this other issue regarding

24

Okay.

Please do.

the CARS database, that is in fact a state database; the Court

2 5 I was correct there.

-281 I
2

This issue has already been addressed by the Court
Mr

Christensen wasn't involved at that time, but the Court

3

I already addressed this in its protective order and then again

4

jm

the motion to compel

5

THE COURT

6

Yeah, I addressed a different issue, though

I addressed whether it was discoverable

Mr

Christensen has

7

I raised the issue of is it unfair -- is there some unfairness in

8

I leaving the inference out there that whatever accident history

9

I has been able to be gleaned from other sources is the entire

10 I accident history
11 I the issue

I don't know if there is or not, but that's

Is there some unfairness in not advising the jury

12

that there -- this is or may be an incomplete accident history,

13

and the reasons why it's incomplete

14

MR

COMBE

Well, I think, your Honor, when we talked

15 I about this earlier, the Court was going to treat the CARS
1 6 I database as if it did not exist, and we were going to proceed
17 I that way

There's no one on the jury that's going to be -- as

18 I far as I know, that's going to be aware of the CARS database
19 I
20

You start talking about the CARS database and then
that's going to raise the confusion

If we approach this case

2 1 I like any others, if they've obtained some accident history by
22

some other method and they want to present that to the jury,

23

that's one way

24

of the CARS database is creating a confusion itself because the

25

CARS -- if the jury doesn't know about that CARS database, I'm

All I think that will happen with the raising

-291 I not sure how it could cause any confusion.
2

I

More importantly, they did obtain all of these accident

3 I records that I'm aware of.
4

Department of Public Safety.

5 I reports
6

They subpoenaed these records from
They obtained 10,000 accident

It's my understanding that they've went through those

I 10,000 accident reports the same way as we would go and create

7 I the CARS database.

So I think it's unfair for them to come back

8 I and say, "Well, we're not sure that this is all of the records."
9

In fact, if they mention the fact that there's this CARS

10 I database, then the jury is wondering whether or not there are
11 I more accidents out there, and there is no evidence -- at least no
12

admissible evidence of any more accidents.

They cannot use that

13 I CARS database under 409 to try and at least imply that there may
14

have been more accidents.

15

any type of instruction.

16

MR. HUMPHERYS:

For that reason, we would object to

Here's part of the problem, your Honor

17 [ When we were -- if the Court remembers, we were moving to compel
18 I the Department of Safety to produce the officer's investigating
19

reports here -- the investigating officer's reports.

2 0 I had records, I believe, through back to about

x

They only

99, and they had

21 I destroyed previous records.
22

The critical time periods relate to the

x

99 -- or excuse

23 I me, the 1995 construction project that dealt with this very 1700
24

feet of lack of barriers -- or barriers on both sides, and it

25 I actually was part of installing the median barriers from the

-301 j north end of that 1700 feet further north.

(JDOT has not provided

2

us with any explanation of why they did not fill that gap in of

3

the 1700 feet.

4 I

The second project is in 1999 when there was another

5 I construction project to the south, and there was some parts of
6 I that construction project that involved placing median barriers.
7

Again, the State chose not to put any median barriers within this

8 I 1700 feet.
9

So the problem we have is really yeah, we can show

that there are accidents from 1999 forward from the subpoenaed

10 I DI-9's, the officer's -- or investigating officer's reports, but
11 I we can't show anything prior to that time because we have no
12 I records.
13 I

So what we're proposing is not getting into the CARS

14 I program.
15

Quite the contrary, it's to simply explain, as

Mr. Christensen has suggested, that there is a law prohibiting

16 I us from going into any of that.

The Court has addressed that

17

because I -- in that part -- as part of that motion to reconsider

18

the Section 409 I addressed the very issue of how this could

19

raise prejudice with both sides or either side, depending on

20

how it's presented.

The Court said the Court is unable to

2 1 I address specific questions about how the evidence and arguments
22

at trial will be affected by the -- well, I'm sorry, that's the

2 3 I disclosure.
24 I

Let's see.

Well, we can brief it another time.

I think -- we'll prepare a proposed jury instruction

2 5 I and we'll present it to Counsel and then we'll submit it to the

-311 I Court.
2
3

THE COURT.

All right

on those two issues today.

I'm not going to decide anything

Have you brought with you your ]ury

4 I instructions 9
5

MS. STEINVOORT:

I have, but unfortunately there was

6 I some typographical errors that I spotted that my paralegal didn't
7

I (inaudible) before I left for court.

I just want to clean those

8

up and hand deliver them.

We have discussed a set already, and

9

there's some that are a little bit different, so I'd like the

10 I opportunity, if that's okay, to just deliver them to the Court
11 I this afternoon and to Mr. Humpherys.

We have gone through

12 I them, though
13

THE COURT-

14

MR. HUMPHERYS

15

of the instructions.

Okay.
We have agreed upon probably 95 percent
I have -- I did not number them because I

16 I have not yet received the UDOT's proposed.
17

THE COURT:

I'd rather have them blank -- at least the

18 I agreed ones I'd rather have them blank.
19

MR. HUMPHERYS:

Right.

We assume the Court would like

2 0 I them in some order that would make sense rather than have us put
21 I them together in order rather than a hodgepodge of stipulated
22 I instructions.
23
24
25

So I'm happy to do that if the Court wishes.

MR. STEINVOORT-

We prepared an index with ours, if that

would be helpful.
THE COURT:

Let's just have a brief meeting tomorrow

-321 I morning, 8:30.

Finish those up and come back and present them to

2 I me in the morning.

Can you do that?

3

MR. HUMPHERYS:

4

MS. STEINVOORT:

5

THE COURT:

6

MS. STEINVOORT:

7

THE COURT:

8

All right.

We'll do that.

Here at the court -- in court?

Yeah.
Okay.

How about your voir dire -- your requested

voir dire, other than the questionnaire, which I have seen, do

9 I you have requested voir dire for me?
10

MS. STEINVOORT:

I submitted mine already.

11

MR. HUMPHERYS:

Ours was within the motion.

12
13

there will be some supplements in light of the Court's decision.
THE COURT:

14 I soon as possible.
15

However,

All right.

If you could give me those as

I haven't seen the State's, so can you just

send me a courtesy copy of that?

16

MS. STEINVOORT:

17

THE COURT:

Sure.

I'm not sure how you want me to handle the

18 I issue of concern that the -- at least that the prospective jurors
19 I will have that this will come out of taxpayer funds.

I mean I'm

20

willing to ask that any way you want me to ask that, but I have

21

some concern that most jurors wouldn't even focus on that issue

22 I unless we raise it.
23
24

MR. HUMPHERYS:

It's an interesting question.

We have

preformed three mock juries on this case, and there were some

2 5 J jurors that were concerned about if there was an award would it

-331 J mean that either UDOT would not be able to perform repairs and/or
2

I would it raise taxes or would it affect taxes or the deficit and

3 | all of the related issues.
4

So that was part of the supplemental

voir dire questions that we were going to think about if the

5 I Court was not going to give the jury questionnaire, but it's
6 I essentially the same subject matter that was in the
7 I questionnaire.
8

THE COURT:

Okay.

I'll look at those very carefully.

9 I I'll ask it any way you want me to ask it.
10

MS. STEINVOORT:

Can I make a suggestion?

It's really

11 I not -- it is not really accurate to say it's taxpayer money
12 I because it's actually state risk management that charges premiums
13

to the client and agency that pays, so it's really no different

14 I than a relationship anyone would have -- a corporation would have
15 I with their insurance carrier.
16 I

Maybe we just -- you should treat the State as it is any

17 I other corporate entity or something of that nature, because it
18 I really —

it's not going to -- the money is not going to come out

19 I of UDOT's budget in the sense they're not going to fix potholes
20

because of verdicts in favor of plaintiffs.

21 I way.

It doesn't work that

There are premiums and --

22

THE COURT:

You want me to tell the jury panel that?

23

MS. STEINVOORT:

No, I'm just saying I don't think it's

2 4 I very accurate to suggest that -- I think you should just say the
2 5 I State is like any other private corporation, you should look at

-341

them as such.

2

They're individuals and they're corporations.

THE COURT:

Well, we can say that all we want, but I

3

mean really -- the concern is that the jury is thinking in the

4

back of their minds, you Know, "Am I ultimately going to pay for

5

this, or am I going to have decreased services because of this."
We won't know that -- the answer to that question, regardless of
what we tell them.

We won't know the answer to that question

unless we ask them something.

9

MS. STEINVOORT:

I would suggest that every person who

10

sits -- I mean if I was called to serve on a medical malpractice

11

jury I think I'd say, "My gosh, how is this going to impact my

12

co-pay or my deductible or something."

13

to make that -- that's just natural for an individual to consider

14

that if they're going to consider it at all, but I don't think we

15

should -- it's not unique to the government.

16

say

17

THE COURT:

18

MS. STEINVOORT:

19

THE COURT:

I mean everyone's going

So I would just

Leave it alone.
Leave it alone.

Ultimately we're

—

Well, I'm not going to leave it alone.

I

20

mean if Mr. Humpherys wants me to get into it -- I think it could

21

be a reasonable decision to leave it alone from both parties'

22

standpoint, but ultimately that's the plaintiff's decision to

23

make, and I think it's a fair subject matter for voir dire if

24

they want to go into it.

25

want to go into it, they can go into it.

So let's not give the option.

If they
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I

Let's see, I had a couple of other things.

2

I looking over the list of witnesses.

I was

Of course, it's always an

3

ambitious trial when you start looking at the number of possible

4

J witnesses in this case and you start thinking about the days we

5 I have set aside
6

I

I'm going to give you some unsolicited advice, which I

7

I strongly believe based upon almost 13 years of sitting through

8

I these trials, and that is if there's one thing that civil lawyers

9

don't get it's that it's the persuasive impact, and that's what

10 I this 30b is ultimately about.

It's the persuasive impact of

11 I brevity and focus.
12 I

I think that there is a real inclination on the part of

13 I civil trial lawyers to over try their cases, to try and address
14 I every nuance, every possibility.
15

You're all smart lawyers.

We

go to law school and the first thing we learn is how to spot

16 I issues, and we get points for the number of issues that we spot.
17 I You don't get points with juries for addressing all of the issues
18 I that you spot.

You get points with juries for focusing on the

19 I elements of your case or the elements of your defense and honing
20 I in like a laser beam on those issues.
21 I

I would -- you're all good writers

22 I briefs.

I've read your

You're not afraid to take an editing pen to the drafts

23 I of your briefs.

Take an editing pen to your proposed cases,

24 I because your cases will have more impact and more persuasive
25

power if they're focused and they really hone in on the issues in

-361 I the case.
2

I

I strongly believe that.

I as a judge during the

3 I course of the trial exercise liberally my discretion under Rule
4

I 611 to cut you off if I think that you're being cumulative.

My

5 I definition of cumulative basically relates to the importance of
6

1 the issue to the case and the extent to which it's controverted.

7

I There can be a really important issue in the case, but if the

8 I defense isn't questioning it -- for example, that somebody is
9 I disabled, then I don't want to hear six witnesses saying that
1 0 I they can't mow their lawn anymore.

I mean if that's not

11 I disputed, even though it's real important to the case for the
12 1 jury to understand that, you know, one witness is probably enough
13 I on that.
14

I'm going to constantly nudge you to move forward and

to not be cumulative in the case.

15 I
16

I would like you to over schedule your witnesses because
I don't want there to be big gaps where the jury is cooling their

17 I heels waiting for the next witness to arrive.
18 I start promptly every day.

We're going to

We're going to put in fairly long

1 9 I days, you know, starting at 8:30 in the morning, brief break mid
2 0 I morning, short lunch -- just an hour -- and a brief break in the
21

afternoon.

22

4:30.

23 I
24

We'll wrap up for the day sometime between 4 and

Do any of you have any questions about how I conduct a

I trial or anything like that?

25 I

MS. STEINVOORT:

We were going to ask you if you had

—

-371 I is there a screen available if someone wants to use it for power
2 I point or something of that nature, or do we need to bring our

3 I own7
4 I

THE COURT:

I'm sure we've got a screen.

5 I and she probably doesn't know.
6

Marianna is kind of new, but she

I can find out.

7
8

Call Marianna,

MS. STEINVOORT:
I

THE COURT:

Okay.

I'm pretty sure that we've got a screen that

9 I you can use, and we can make arrangements for that.
10
11

MR. HUMPHERYS:

Are we going all five days of that --

the week of the 24th?

12

THE COURT:

I'm pretty sure the answer to that is yes,

13 I but let me just look right here.
14

MR. HUMPHERYS:

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. HUMPHERYS:

We are.

Each morning at 8:30

Each morning at 8:30 a.m.
In light of that we would anticipate

17 I completing our case by Wednesday evening.
18

THE COURT:

20

MR. HUMPHERYS:

21

THE COURT:

25

Excellent.

I appreciate --

We --

And by all means, you know, be generous in

letting each other know your order of witnesses so that you can

23 I be prepared.
24

I say that so that

UDOT can --

19

22

a.m.7

I think that's the professional and helpful thing

to do.
MR. HUMPHERYS:

We will be submitting a trial plan which

-381 I will have a complete breakdown of when we anticipate each
2 I witness, the time that we anticipate each side taking.

We won't

3

have their side unless they want to contribute that information,

4

but we've already prepared that and we'll provide that to the

5 I Court at the commencement of trial.
6
7

THE COURT:

Thank you very much.

J ]ust put another pitch for settlement.

Anything else 9

Let me

It looks like you're on

8

your way to the war path, and that's fine.

I'm happy to try this

9

case, and I look forward to working with good lawyers, but now is

10 I the time to take one last shot at settlement.
11 I moving m

With this trial

]ust a couple of weeks, before you spend more money,

12 I take one more shot, see if you can get it settled
13

that to your judgment and discretion.

14

you with today 9

15

trial.

16 i

I'll leave

Anything else I can help

See you briefly tomorrow and then get ready for

(Hearing concluded)
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ADDENDUM 3

JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 51
Reference to CARS Program
During the trial there will be references made by some of the witnesses to the CARS
system or database. This instruction is given to assist you in understanding those references.
UDOT maintains a computer-based database of the accidents occurring on State and
Federal Roads in Utah ("CARS"). This database is maintained under federal guidelines for the
pxirpose of receiving Federal-aid highway funding for improvements of state and federal
roadways.
A federal statute (23 U.S.C. Sec. 409) prohibits accident victims who are pursuing
lawsuits (like the Millers), and their attorneys or experts, from obtaining or using information
from this database. Consequently, you should not be critical of the Millers for not having that
information or of UDOT for not providing it.
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P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on March 29, 2010)

3
4

THE COURT:

Good morning

Let's take the matter of

I Miller vs. Utah Department of Transportation.

Your appearances,

5 J please.
MR. HUMPHERYS:

My name is L. Rich Humpherys for the

pla mtiffs .
MS. STEINVOORT:
9

Sandra Stemvoort and Steve Combe for

I the defendant, UDOT.

10
11

THE COURT:

All right.

I take it mitigation -- or I

mean mediation didn't help?

12

MR. HUMPHERYS:

Well, it was more than -- I mean it

13

wasn't just a perfunctory -- I mean there was a serious good

14

faith effort, and I think we should let the Court know that, but

15 I it was not successful.
16 j

THE COURT:

I appreciate very much you making the

17

effort.

18

settled, but let's get this case

19

Well, no, that won't work.

More often than not that will end in a case being

20

MR. HUMPHERYS:

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. HUMPHERYS:

23

How about April 19th"?

April 20 th .

I am gone three days of that week.

Let's try the next week, the 26th.
I have two federal hearings that week,

but in May I'm wide open.
MR. COMBE:

24
25

tried.

Honor.

I have a trial the first week of May, your
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MR

2

MR. COMBE.

3

MR. HUMPHERYS

4

HUMPHERYS.

Is your trial all week'?

No, it's only one day.
One day.

What about the week of the 10th

of May 7

5

THE COURT:

I've got -- I don't have consecutive days

6

that week, as I have to -- that's a week that I have to do

7

preliminary hearings on Tuesday and Thursday.

8

MR. HUMPHERYS:

9

THE COURT:

The 17th''

That week won't work because of the district

10

court conference on the 20 th and 22 nd .

11

would put us over Memorial Day, which I don't mind.

12
13

MR

HUMPHERYS-

So we' re at the 24 th , which

Does the Court have one of the days of

the week that he uses for law and motion 7

14

THE COURT.

No, I usually ]ust handle anything that has

15

to be handled during the trial early in the morning before we

16

start

17

MR. HUMPHERYS:

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. HUMPHERYS:

So we'll have the full five days?

Yes.
We were ]ust talking before, and Counsel

20

and I believe that it will take a total of seven days with jury

21

and closings and openings.

22

THE COURT:

23

conversations.

24

weekend?

25

That's what I understood from our previous

What do you think about going over Memorial Day

MS. STEINVOORT:

It's fine with me.
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MR. COMBE:

It's fine with me.

2

THE COURT:

All right, then.

3

MR. COMBE

I bet the jury will.

4

likes to be kept over Memorial Day.

5

THE COURT:

Let's start the 24 th .
I'm not sure a jury

Once again, I don't --

I'm sure they'd prefer not to.

It would

6

be harder to seat a jury because some people will be taking

7

additional days off, but --

8
9

MR. COMBE:
Memorial Day weekend?

10
11

When would be the next day after that

MR. HUMPHERYS:

The week of the 7th?

I'm open on the 7 th

as well.

12

THE COURT

The week of the 7th I'm covering for Judge

13

Christiansen, because we've lost a judge with Steve Roth being

14

appointed to the Court of Appeals, and so she's going out to West

15

Jordan, and we have to take turns covering her calendar.

Boy, I

16

tell you, is there really no way we can do this earlier'

What

17

day of the week did you have a hearing in May?

18
19

MR. COMBE:

trial will be the 7th.

20
21

THE COURT:

the

It's down in Provo.

I want to go back and look at that time

MR. COMBE:

Did we rule out the 10th, the week of the

THE COURT:

We did because I have two criminal days that

10th?

24
25

The -- it's —

period, then.

22
23

The 7tb, your Honor.

week.

What if we started -- let's see, now what were your issues
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I on the week of the 26 t h , M r .

2

MR. H U M P H E R Y S :

3

THE C O U R T :

4

MR. H U M P H E R Y S :
I both major hearings

6

THE C O U R T :

7

MR. H U M P H E R Y S :

8

THE C O U R T :

9

MR. HUMPHERYS:

10
11
12

MS

13

personally.

14
15
16
17
18

26 t h .

I have two federal h e a r i n g s , and

-- summary
What

they're

judgment.

days?
Pardon

Which

me?

days?

One is the 27 t h and one is the 28 t h .

So if we started the 29 t h and 30 t h , that only

THE C O U R T :
I gives us six

The week of -- oh, April?

April

5

Humpherys?

days.
STEINVOORT:

I think we could do it in six days,

Do you?

MR. C O M B E :

Well,

I still

(inaudible) make sure we're

done.
MR. H U M P H E R Y S :

I have a final pre-trial with

Judge

I Jenkins on the 7 t h , and I don't know if the Court has had
experience with him, but his pre-trials

are not the type where

19

I you just come in and kind of work out the logistics

20

I He actually pre-tries the case and there's usually multiple

21

I and it takes either half the day or all day if he's scheduled

22
23
24
25

for trial.
days

for that.
THE C O U R T :

Yeah.

We won't be using the 7 t h anyway

because M r . Combe is.
MR. H U M P H E R Y S :

Do you need time for preparation

for

it
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2

that?
J

MR. COMBE:

That trial?

3

MR. HUMPHERYS:

4

THE COURT:

5
6

That's pushing him.

All right.

Maybe the -- I mean we're not

g o n g to get a perfect situation unless A/e go out way farther
I than I'm anxious to go out.

What time is your hearing on the

date -- in the 28th?

7
8
9

I will need some.

MR. HUMPHERYS:

My hearing?

It is the -- it's at 2:30

I before Judge Benson.

10

THE COURT:

11 j pick a ]ury.

I say we start the morning of the 28 th ,

Maybe that's all we'll be able to do.

Maybe we

1 2 I will also be able to do closing arguments -- I mean opening
13

statements, and then go from there to the 6th.

14
15

MR. HUMPHERYS:

I do need a little bit of time to

prepare for that motion for summary judgment.

That kind of

1 6 I really pushes me, your Honor.
17 I

THE COURT:

18

MR. HUMPHERYS:

1 9 I could go.
20

Well, you've got between now and then.
Yes.

Well, I wish that were the way it

I wish I could prepare a week in advance and then have

everything fresh on my mind

21 I

MR. COMBE:

22

MR. HUMPHERYS:

What would be the --

I just don't want to end on Memorial Day.
What would be the problem if we were to

2 3 I start on the 3rd -- was the entire week of the 10 th out for the
24
25

Court?
THE COURT:

No, just Tuesday and Thursday -- well,
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Friday is also out.

2

MR. HUMPHERYS-

3

THE COURT:

4

Okay

That --

I mean if we started on the 3rd we wouldn't

be able to use the 7th, but we could use the 10 th .

5

MR. COMBE:

6

weekend will have to be it.

7

pool we're going to get there and what's going to be --

8
9

THE COURT:

Your Honor, if it helps, maybe Memorial Day

Yeah.

I just don't know what kind of jury

Let's plan on starting the 24 th -- May

24 th , and we'll go through June 2nd.

How about final pre-trial on

10

May 10th at 8 30

11

enough that they can be ready to be heard at the final pre-trial

12

conference.

Any motions in limine should be filed soon

13

I would like you at the final pre-trial conference to

14

give me your written proposed voir dire, and also I would like

15

you in advance of final pre-trial to meet together and attempt to

16

agree on a set of jury instructions.

17

able to agree on the jury instructions, submit one copy of the

18

agreed instructions that is blank both with respect to numbers

19

and authorities.

20

to request that haven't been agreed on, submit two copies of

21

those, one that's blank and one has -- the one that has both

22

numbers and authorities.

23
24
25

To the extent that you're

If there are additional instructions you want

MR. HUMPHERYS:

Any questions about any of that?
Let's see, your Honor.

Are you going to

work on a 9 to 5 schedule 7
THE COURT:

We'll start most days at 8:30, and we'll

1
2

break between

4 and 4.30, depending

MR. HUMPHERYS*

4

THE C O U R T :

5

MR. H U M P H E R Y S :

6

THE C O U R T :

7

MR. H U M P H E R Y S :
I the morning and

9
10

I

11

MR. C O M B E :

How about dispositive m o t i o n s , J u d g e 9

By

On May 10 t h .

Are we still going to do

dispositive

I motions9

16

MR. C O M B E :

17

MR. H U M P H E R Y S :

18

I thought we --

I don't

know.

We don't have any.

I think it's

all

factual.

19

25

in

that day as well?

MR. H U M P H E R Y S :

24

I as sume you have at least one break

Right.

15

23

One hour.

THE C O U R T :

THE C O U R T :

22

long?

afternoon9

13

21

lunch hour is how

From noon to one.

M S . STEINVOORT:

20

Your

It's just an hour,

12

14

with

j witnesses.

3

8

upon how we're doing

I

MR. C O M B E :

If we do we'll get them in before

then.

THE C O U R T :

W e l l , if you do we're probably not going

to

have the trial, then.
M S . STEINVOORT:

Do you want us to have it all

completed

in April and argue it in April or -THE C O U R T :

W e l l , if you're serious about

filing

dispositive m o t i o n s , let's do that before we set a trial d a t e .

1

MR

2

THE COURT

3

HUMPHERYS:

I object, your Honor

I mean didn't you have a cutotf time

dispositive motions in your scheduling

4

MR

5

MR. C O M B E :

6

MR

HUMPHERYS-

order9

Y e s , we did.

When was

HUMPHERYS:

that9

W e l l , it was quite some time ago, and

7

the only reason we allowed

8

of the supplemental p r o d u c t i o n , but it wasn't

9

it was from UDOT.

some additional discovery was

The supplemental deposition again was

deposition of my expert on a supplemental

report, so if

11

wasn't a basis before there isn't a basis

now

12

THE COURT:

W e l l , what --

13

MR. COMBE:

Your Honor

14

THE COURT*

Tell me what you're thinking.

You

have a motion

for summary judgment on -- just so I know

16

we're talking

about.

MR. C O M B E :

If there is a basis

it would be

18

discretionary

19

Act.

20

those recently -- talked about a dispositive motion

21

If it did then I don't have a problem, but I'm

22

The part of the basis

23

include the expert's testimony which was taken

24
25

function

there

might
what

under

immunity under the Governmental

not sure the scheduling orders -- I haven't

THE COURT:

UDOT's

--

15

I'm

because

from the p l a i n t i f f ,

10

17

for

Immunity
looked

at

cutoff d a t e .

not sure it did.

for that motion would include -last

certainly

Friday.

W e l l , none of us have the scheduling

order

in mind so I guess I'm not going to rule one way or the other on
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whether or not such a motion is timely.

2

you think you have a motion, we may need to have a further

3

discussion

4

MR. COMBE:

Okay.

5

THE COURT.

Anything else 7

6

MR

HUMPHERYS:

Look at that and if

What about jury questionnaires 9

This

7

is involving the State of Utah, and during these economic times

8

there could very well be some substantial biases.

9

those need to be ferreted out because we have a risk management.

I think that

10

It's not UDOT that would actually be paying for it.

11

think it's fairly important that we be able to explore whether

12

people might think that an action against UDOT would mean that

13

it's going to crimp the budget.

14

be done in quiet moments as opposed to --

15

THE COURT:

So to me, I

Sometimes I think that needs to

I'm not really a fan of the jury

16

questionnaires, and I don't see any reason for one in this case

17

If one thing, it adds another day to the trial

18

that I've been able (inaudible) to do it without having the jury

19

come in a day earlier to do the questionnaires, which means that

20

the State of Utah has to pay to bring the whole jury panel back

21

on two different days.

22

that in this case.

23
24
25

MR. HUMPHERYS:

I'm just -- I don't see any reason to do

All right.

voir dire?
THE COURT:

There's no way

I don't.

Does the Court allow Counsel

-11MR. HUMPHERYS:

1

Okay.

Well, I find that a very

2

significant issue that can taint how a juror's attitude toward a

3

case against UDOT or the State, and I'm very concerned about it

4
5

THE COURT.

Well, I will try and explore it fully.

I don't give short shrift to the voir dire that I conduct.

It

isn't just perfunctory, and I give them -- I give the jurors a
chance to express themselves.

If you don't think I've fully

covered it I'll give you chances to suggest additional questions

9

that I should ask, but that is not the kind of issue that seems

10

to me necessarily requires a questionnaire and the additional

11

expense and time that it would take.

12
13

MR. COMBE:

Anything else?

How about a final designation of fact

witnesses we intend to use 7

14

THE COURT:

Rule 26 would say that those need to be

15

done, as well as your exhibit list, three days before trial.

16

So you've got a date for that.

17

MR. COMBE:

18

MS. STEINVOORT:

Okay.
Just your Honor, this case has

19

stagnated over time, so we don't have any current -- for example,

20

income and medical.

21

we have the final numbers and final amounts that he (inaudible).

22
23
24
25

We have the medical expenses.

MR. HUMPHERYS:
can.

Just so that

We'll get those to you as soon as we

I think we've given you most of the medical if not all.
MS. STEINVOORT:

Well, we just want to know the liens we

haven't heard about before.
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MR. HUMPHERYS:

Well, the lien was from his present

2

medical carrier, and you've got the medical expenses for that.

3

It's just the medical carrier has a lien against any recovery for

4

that amount.

5

MS. STEINVOORT:
MR. HUMPHERYS:

Okay.
All right.

We'll let Rule 26, then,

govern the exhibits and fact witness designations.
THE COURT:

9

All right.

Well, I guess I'll see you for

the next time on May 10 th .

10

MS. STEINVOORT:

11

THE COURT:

12

(Hearing concluded)

Should I prepare an order, your Honor?

Yeah, if you would, please.
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ADDENDUM 5

INSTRUCTION NO- 49

UDOT's Liability Cap

As of the date of this accident, injury claims against a governmental agency such as
UDOT is limited and capped at the amount of $532,500 for one individual and $1,065,000 for all
claims arising out of one accident. In other words, any one of the Millers injury claims is
limited to an amount no higher than $532,500, but their total injury claims together cannot
exceed $1,065,000.

This "cap" applies only to injury damages, not to personal property damage.

If you find that UDOT was at fault to any degree, you must still determine the amount of
total damages that each of the Millers have suffered. I will make any reductions or adjustments
later.

ADDENDUM 6

INSTRUCTION NO. 55

If you make an award of damages against UDOT, you should not concern yourself with
how the payment will be made. A payment of an award will not affect roadway services or
maintenance. The source of any money that will be used to pay an award must not influence you
to award more or less in damages. The award of damages must be based only on the evidence
you have heard during the trial. You must not speculate on anything else.

